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ABSTRACT 
It is well established among the intelligence community that terrorists view the 
acquisition of nuclear or radiological materials (NRAM) as a goal in furtherance of their 
efforts to attack the U.S. within its borders.  The use of NRAM in a nuclear weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD) or a radiological dispersion device (RDD) could potentially kill 
and injure thousands of American citizens.  The economic impact of such a terrorist act 
on U.S. soil could cause profound economic damage, and would terrify the nation. 
While international efforts have been underway for many years to better secure 
military nuclear weapons and materials, this research finds that a comprehensive national 
security strategy in the U.S. for commercial nuclear  materials is needed.  While some 
strides were made in 2005 through measures taken by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to better secure nuclear generating power facilities, there is no 
similar comprehensive security strategy for NRAM stored or being transported in the 
U.S.  This poses a potentially serious threat to our homeland security. 
This research reviews the present statutory and regulatory scheme for NRAM, and 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is a growing concern among many federal authorities for the potential use 
by terrorists of nuclear and radiological materials (NRAM) in a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) or a radiological dispersion device (RDD), also known as a “dirty 
bomb”, on U.S. soil.1  The level of concern in this subject area is evident by virtue of the 
number of federal homeland security initiatives presently underway by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD), the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), and the newly created 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).2  Such initiatives all focus upon detecting the concealed movement of 
unauthorized NRAM by highway, waterway, and air. 
There are basically only two ways NRAM could be used by terrorists within the 
U.S.  The material could be purchased or stolen outside the U.S. and smuggled in, or it 
could be stolen within the U.S. borders and used for malevolent purposes.  The focus of 
this paper is exclusively upon the theft of commercial NRAM within the U.S.  The 
potential theft of military grade NRAM is not the subject of this research. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Should the national policy be changed to better ensure stronger security 
surrounding commercial NRAM?  Also, when such materials are being shipped, what 
should our national policy be regarding security measures as commercial NRAM move 
across our nation? 
 
 
                                                 
1 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism is the Greatest Threat to National Security (Detroit, MI: 
Thomson Gale. 2005), 12. 
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Press Release Announcing the Opening of the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (Washington, D.C.:Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 1. 
  2
C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to determine whether there is a need for a more 
stringent national policy on commercial NRAM shipment security.  If so, how should that 
change be accomplished? 
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Today’s terrorist threat is asymmetrical and unpredictable.  Unlike conventional 
enemies, the objective of many international and domestics terrorists is to exact major 
casualties and economic damage among the civilian population in a manner that terrifies 
the nation.  It is difficult to imagine a more effective tool than nuclear or radiological 
material detonated in a densely populated area. 
It is incumbent upon all those engaged in homeland security efforts to explore 
ways to detect suspected terrorist activity, to prevent its successful execution, and to 
protect these deadly and valuable assets from getting into the hands of terrorists.  If gaps 
or deficiencies exist in protecting NRAM and those nuclear facilities in which they are 
stored or used, they must be identified and remedied as quickly as possible.3  Otherwise, 
our efforts to secure the homeland may fail, and the U.S. could experience the use of a 
WMD of nuclear or radiological proportions on U.S. soil.  Increased collaboration among 
federal, state, and local authorities in the security effort will heighten situational 
awareness around these important assets, enabling us to meet the national preparedness 
goals. 
This research will show the need for a more comprehensive national security 
policy regarding the storage and shipment of NRAM in the U.S.  The research suggests 
those federal security requirements that presently exist are the responsibility of a number 
of federal agencies, and have significant gaps.  In an effort to address some of these gaps, 
some states have attempted to close tighten security through state regulation; however, 
                                                 
3 Unless otherwise specified, references to “nuclear facilities” are intended to include all parts of the 
nuclear sector to include commercial nuclear power plants; research and test reactors; nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities; radioactive waste management facilities; deactivated nuclear facilities; facilities housing 
radioactive materials; and radioactive source production and distribution facilities.  
  3
the states cannot solve this problem.  Research points to the need for a comprehensive 
national security plan to ensure the safe and secure storage and shipment of NRAM in the 
U.S.  The research findings call for a national solution. 
 
E. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
While more research is needed, the literature reviewed for this analysis took many 
forms.  A federal statute renders some of the materials protected as “SAFEGUARDS”.4  
This made gaining access to some regulations a bit more challenging but not impossible.  
The Illinois Emergency Management Agency’s Division of Nuclear Safety (DNS), the 
DOE, and contacts in the nuclear industry assisted in gaining access to the necessary 
materials to accomplish a thorough review.  Most significantly, the University of Chicago 
and the Argonne National Laboratory assisted by providing access to research and a 
cadre of nuclear scientists who are focused upon homeland security issues related to 
NRAM. 
A number of federal statutes and regulations touch portions of the issues 
presented; these were reviewed and compared.  The enforcement agencies for these 
provisions include the NRC, the DOE, the DOT, and others.  From the research, it is clear 
Congress empowered the NRC, the DOE, and the DOT with overlapping statutory and 
regulatory authority for the areas of nuclear power generating stations and the 
transportation of non-military NRAM.  After September 11, 2001, Congress also tasked 
the DHS with ensuring the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure, including the 
nuclear sector.  Yet there are gaps in these security efforts and at present it appears that 
the DHS has very little operational control over these efforts.  For instance, the more 
stringent regulations that apply to nuclear power generating facilities do not apply to non-
fueled or non-operating facilities, even though nuclear fuel may be stored there.  They 
also do not apply to nuclear storage facilities.  Furthermore, while it appears that the  
 
 
                                                 
4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information, Criteria 
and Guidance, Public Law NUREG-0794 (1981). 
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NRC has maintained limited authority over the uranium ore processing facility, no 
specific regulations have been promulgated to clearly require securing it in the proper 
manner. 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports, Congressional hearings minutes, 
and a variety of journals pointed to issues associated with the lack of clear lines of 
responsibility for security on many types of NRAM shipments.  Both law enforcement 
and science-related journals pointed to issues associated with a lack of security in NRAM 
shipments.  Congressional hearings held on the issue indicated that a problem exists and 
that operational control by a single agency is needed.  The number of federal initiatives 
presently underway also suggests this issue is the focus of attention. 
In some ways, this topic appears to be a Rubik’s Cube with many dimensions 
leading to the same question of whether there is sufficient NRAM security.  To fully 
grasp this subject area, it was necessary to research and strip away various layers of 
governmental oversight one layer at a time. 
Sources considered in this research were categorized as For Official Use Only 
(FOUO), Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES), and Safeguards Information (SGI).  In order 
to simply gain access to some of the research it was necessary to secure a “Top Secret” 
“Q” clearance through the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
DOE. 
This research, intended for senior policy makers at the federal level, will focus 
attention on the security measures surrounding the storage and movement of commercial 
nuclear and radiological materials (NRAM) throughout the U.S.  At no time should this 
research be misconstrued to refer to the weapons, materials, or related activities under the 
authority of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 
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II. THE THREAT 
A. TERRORISTS HAVE THE INTENT TO ATTACK OUR HOMELAND 
THROUGH THE USE OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS 
Among the areas in homeland security which are of most concern to federal 
authorities is the potential use of nuclear or radiological materials (NRAM) in a weapon 
of mass destruction (WMD) or a radiological dispersal device (RDD), also known as a 
“dirty bomb”, on U.S. soil.5  This concern is based upon a number of reliable sources, not 
the least of which is an ABC interview in which Osama bin Laden, reportedly the leader 
of al Qaeda, stated that he sees acquiring nuclear weapons as a “religious duty.”6  Such 
concerns have a factual underpinning that goes beyond mere political rhetoric.  Research 
conducted by the Institute of Science and International Security reviewed documents 
seized in al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and elsewhere indicating al Qaeda  
leadership is highly interested in acquiring and utilizing nuclear and radiological weapons 
along with other types of WMD and has made several unsuccessful attempts to acquire 
enriched uranium .7 
There is other evidence to support this contention.  For example, Australia has 
uncovered terrorist plots against its nuclear facilities.8  According to a report by the  
 
 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Draft (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government, 2006). 
6 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Interview with Bin Ladin, World's Most Wanted Terrorist,” ABC News, 
1999, http://www.islamistwatch.org/blogger/localstories/05-06-03/ABCInterview.html (accessed 4 April 
2006). 
7 D. Albright, “Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” Policy 
Forum Online, November 16 (2002).; D. Albright, K. Buehler and H. Higgins, “Bin Laden and the Bomb,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 1 (2002). 
8 Associated Press, “Prosecutor Seeks Guilty Verdict for Terror Suspect Extradited from Australia,” 
International Herald Tribune, Sec. European Region, 9 February 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/09/europe/EU-GEN-France-Terror-Trial.php.; Associated Press, 
“Police Say they Stopped Suspects Near a Reactor,” Bloomington Pantagraph, 2006. 
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Center for Nonproliferation Studies, between 1997 and 2004 there have been a number of 
incidents that provide evidence of the al Qaeda’s interest in various WMD, including 
nuclear and radiological devices.9 
In the popular TV show “24” a terrorist recently detonated a suitcase nuclear 
bomb in Los Angeles, but could this really happen?  According to Joe Cirincione, a 
nuclear expert at the Center for American Progress and author of the book “Bomb Scare” 
it could happen.  Cirincione advises, “There is a better than even chance of something 
like this happening within the next ten years.”  According to Cirincione this is, “Our 
greatest unmet national security threat.”10 
The research reveals that the threat goes beyond al Qaeda to other groups as 
well.11  There is evidence to suggest that some U.S. domestic terrorist groups have 
expressed an interest in collaborating with al Qaeda in an effort to join forces against the 
U.S.  In a March, 2005, interview the reported leader of the Aryan Nations, August Kreis, 
advised a CNN news reporter that he hopes the Aryan Nations can join forces with al 
Qaeda, as they have a “common cause.”  When asked if he had a message to al Qaeda, 
Kreis advised, “The message is, the cells are out here and they are already in place.  They 




                                                 
9 Lindsey DeFazio, Mathew Osborne and Benjamin Heath, Chart: Al-Qa'Ida's WMD Activities 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2005), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjm_cht.htm 
(accessed 25 September 2006). See Table #1 in Appendix. 
10 Joe Cirincione, Bomb Scare the History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2007). 
11 S. Daly, J. V. Parachini and W. Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor,” 
RAND Project Air Force (2005), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.pdf (accessed 2 December 2006). 
12 Henry Schuster, “An Unholy Alliance, Aryan Nation Leader Reaches Out to Al Qaeda,” 
CNN.Com29 March, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/29/schuster.column/index.html (accessed 2 
December 2006). 
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According to reports collected by the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat & 
Risk Analysis Center, there have been a number of suspicious activity incidents around 
nuclear facilities and NRAM shipments in the U.S.  While a percentage of these could 
certainly be explained away, the likelihood that terrorists are conducting surveillance 
activity and probing security measures around these assets cannot be discounted.13 
One such instance occurred in 2003, at an Illinois nuclear fuel processing facility. 
An unscheduled tractor trailer arrived to load and transport NRAM.  Armed security 
guards became suspicious and searched the truck finding a notebook containing 
handwritten notes describing security measures at the facility, a ballistic vest, night vision 
goggles, a gas mask, handcuffs, and a pepper spray canister.  Further investigation 
revealed that the driver and an accomplice were planning a theft of NRAM.  The 
accomplice had been encountered earlier in the evening in Missouri when law 
enforcement officers there found him blocking traffic with his vehicle and kneeling in the 
road in traditional Muslim prayer.  An investigation further revealed that both of these 
subjects had anti-government views and that one of the subjects had expressed the desire 
to kill the President of the United States.14 
If, as Congressional hearings and reports from the DHS and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) indicate, there is a credible basis for believing that terrorists may have 
an interest in securing NRAM for use in an attack, then something must be done right 
away to address this issue.15  According to the 9/11 Commission, a terrorist group armed 
with the needed nuclear material, “could fashion a nuclear device that would fit in a van 
like the one Ramzi Yousef parked in the garage of the World Trade Center in 1993,” and 
could level Lower Manhattan.16 
                                                 
13 M/Sgt. Steven Shields, Illinois State Police Field Report F 22-03-149, 2003; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Analysis 
Center (HITRAC) Quarterly Report, 2006. 
14 M/Sgt. Steven Shields, Illinois State Police Field Report F 22-03-149, 2003. 
15 G.T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism is the Greatest Threat to National Security (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press 1996), 12.  
16 T. H. Kean and L. H. Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: WW Norton & Company, 
2004), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html (accessed 1 February 2006), 380. 
  8
Current research clearly shows there are many opportunities for terrorists to 
obtain NRAM outside the U.S.  Literally tons of NRAM are vulnerable to theft within the 
former Soviet Union and in a number of other countries worldwide.17 According to a 
November, 2004, report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), there 
are over 120 nuclear facilities around the world with 20 kilograms of highly enriched 
uranium.  Security at many of these facilities consists of only a night watchman or a 
chain fence.18 
In the popular TV show “24” a terrorist recently detonated a suitcase nuclear 
bomb in Los Angeles, but could this really happen?  According to Joe Cirincione, a 
nuclear expert at the Center for American Progress and author of the book “Bomb Scare”, 
“There is a better than even chance of something this happening within the next ten 
years.”  According to Cirincione, this problem is, “Our greatest national security 
threat.”19 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), from 1993 to 
2004, there were 630 cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive material.20  
According to a 2006 report from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, 
“If terrorists could steal, buy or make a nuclear bomb, there can be little confidence that 
the government could stop them from smuggling it into the United States.  After all, 
thousands of tons of illegal drugs and hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants cross 
the U.S. borders every year, despite massive efforts to stop them.”21  As another report  
 
 
                                                 
17 M. Bunn, A. Wier and N. T. Initiative, Securing the Bomb 2006 (Cambridge: Harvard University; 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006), http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb (accessed 2 September 2006), 3. 
18 M. Bunn and G. Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Post-September 11 Threats of 
Theft and Sabotage,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management 30, no. 3 (2002): 48. 
19 Joe Cirincione, Bomb Scare the History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (NY: Columbia University 
Press, 2007). 
20 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” 8 
November 2004, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n013.html (accessed 20 
December 2006).   
21 Bunn et al., Securing the Bomb 2006, 4. 
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points out, since the essential elements of a nuclear bomb can fit into a briefcase, and the 
weak radiation these materials emit can be difficult to detect with use of shielding, there 
are a myriad number of ways this terrorist method could be used against citizens.22 
 
B. SUCH MATERIAL, IF USED IN WMD OR RDD HAS THE POTENTIAL 
TO HARM A LARGE POPULATION AND INFLICT SUBSTANTIAL 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb made with highly enriched 
uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts estimate that a successful improvised 
nuclear device could have yields in the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 
20,000 tons of TNT).  A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the bomb that 
destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-size U.S. city and result in 
thousands of casualties and radiation contamination over a wider area.23 
An RDD or dirty bomb combines conventional explosives such as dynamite with 
radioactive material using explosive force to disperse the radioactive material over a large 
area, such as multiple city blocks. The extent of contamination would depend on a 
number of factors, including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive 
material used, and weather conditions. While much less destructive than an improvised 
nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness for 
people nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and social 
disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the contaminated 
areas.24 While no terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists 
placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although  
                                                 
22 M. Bunn, A. Wier and J. P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card 
and Action Plan (Cambridge: Harvard University, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Project on Managing the 
Atom, 2003), 15-19, http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/report.asp (accessed 1 February 2006). 
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Draft (2006), 75. 
24 W. C. Conklin, “Proposed Framework for Cleanup and Site Restoration Following a Terrorist 
Incident Involving Radioactive Material,” Health Physics 89, no. 5 (November 2005): 575-582; S. V. 
Musolino and F. T. Harper, “Emergency Response Guidance for the First 48 Hours After the Outdoor 
Detonation of an Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device,” Health Physics 90, no. 4 (April 2006): 377-
385. 
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the device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the incident 
demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to use radiological 
materials as weapons of terror.25 
Dr. Harvey Drucker is a nuclear scientist at Argonne National Laboratory.  He has 
written many papers focusing upon the health risks of NRAM.  He has been involved in 
determining levels of risk as a function of radiological exposure and specific material of 
concern.  He has published a number of papers on the transport of nuclear materials 
through the food chain and is chair of the Illinois Terrorism Task Force’s Science and 
Technology Committee. 
According to Dr. Drucker, RDDs are a threat because nuclear materials are 
readily available to terrorists. Those used in industry and medicine have been 
inadvertently released in Latin America and in the U.S. In Latin America, they were 
responsible for deaths from radiation sickness and in some cases leukemia. Transuranic 
elements derived from reactor operations and wastes from nuclear processing are 
available from Russia and other countries. These pose a short term risk of radiation 
sickness but, more importantly, they pose a long term health risk in the form of cancers 
from bone to blood.26 
Dr. Drucker advised, “The components of a nuclear bomb could be shipped to the 
U.S. in amounts less than critical mass. With appropriate shielding, they would be easily 
shippable by air or private truck through U.S. borders, and then assembled into a nuclear 
device. These materials are available from Russia and its former satellite countries.  Their 
explosive effect would probably be less than that of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki devices, 
but they would still pose a significant explosive threat and would cause a wide dispersion 
of radioactive materials; both a significant pathological and psychological risk.”27 
A report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Harvard University suggests that 
even a crude terrorist bomb would be capable of incinerating the heart of a major city.  
                                                 
25 C. D. Ferguson, T. Kazi and J. Perera, Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security 
Risks (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2003), 
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1909.pdf (accessed 10 November 2006), 18. 
26 Dr. Harvey Drucker (Argonne National Laboratory), e-mail messages to author, 16 February 2007. 
27 Ibid. 
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With an explosive power of 10,000 tons of TNT (which is a smaller than the bomb used 
on Hiroshima, Japan), on a typical work day in downtown Manhattan such a bomb could 
kill half a million people and cause more than $1 trillion in direct economic damage.28 
Figure 1 below created by the Argonne National Laboratory depicts the potential 
impact of a 10 kiloton nuclear device in downtown Chicago.  It depicts the estimated 
fatality rate assuming people have no advance warning and without appropriate sheltering 
or shielding.  The fatality rates will vary depending upon a number of factors, including 
whether it is day or night time during the blast.  If, for example, the event were during the 
Taste of Chicago / July 4th events, the prompt death toll could be over one million.  On a 
“normal” workday, the death toll could be several hundred thousand.  If it were a winter 
night, the estimates are less clear. 
Similarly, the fallout dose contours assume an unsheltered population exposed for 
twenty-four hours.  If people could find a well shielded fallout shelter for a day or two 
before going out in the open, there would be much lower radiation effects.  Better yet, if 
they could be evacuated before the fallout arrives, then there would be no adverse health 
effects.  More realistically, most people in the path of the fallout would probably try to 
self evacuate, ending up stuck in traffic jams, which would be equivalent to being 
unshielded.  In that case, there could be several hundred thousand more casualties since 
the fallout plume extends for at least twenty miles downwind.29 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) assesses risk as a function of 
consequence, vulnerability, and threat.  Following that model, the risk of NRAM being 
used domestically as a weapon against the U.S. is high.30 
 
                                                 
28 Bunn et al., Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, 38. 
29 Eugene Frank Moore, (U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program, Region V) e-
mail messages to author, 3 January 2007. 
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Draft (2006). 
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Unfortunately, most first responder agencies are woefully unprepared to respond 
to a nuclear or radiological incident, making the likelihood of prompt and effective 
emergency medical care a major concern.31 
                                                 
31 Kathleen McDonald and W. Sean McLaughlin, “First Responders: Ready or Not?” Law 
Enforcement Trainer 18, no. 3 (May/June 2003): 14. 
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III. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
A. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
A shipment of cobalt 60, a potentially deadly radioactive material, is being 
shipped by a company in Canada to the Port of Los Angeles, where it will be loaded on a 
ship to be taken to China, a common pathway for this material.  The contractor hired to 
move the material does so with a conventional tractor/trailer.  The trip will take several 
days; and, except for registering with “Transcom,” an electronic tracking service used by 
the DOE, there is no security on the shipment.  The tracking device is affixed to the 
trailer, not the nuclear cargo itself, which is common among most shippers.  While there 
is a schedule for the shipment, it is completely up to the driver as to when and where he 
will stop for fuel and breaks, including his rest time required by DOT regulations.  Most 
state and local authorities are completely unaware of such shipments passing through 
their jurisdictions. 
The shipment enters the U.S. at the U.S. / Canadian border in Michigan.  As it  
moves south through Michigan, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) agents in Illinois 
learn from the Illinois Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center (ST&IC) that a right 
wing extremist group is apparently “planning something big.”  The informant, a source 
within the organization, has advised agents that the group is planning a “major event” 
that will “rock America.”  While JTTF agents run investigative leads, the ST&IC begins 
to survey all major gatherings scheduled in the Midwest, contacting its partners within 
the fusion centers of the surrounding states through an intelligence sharing network 
covering all the states in the Midwest region, as well as across the U.S. The information 
is quickly assembled and analyzed.  The ST&IC learns that members of this same 
extremist group appear to be planning something in the St. Louis, Missouri, area during 
the next week.  The ST&IC checks schedules of major sporting events and other 
activities in St. Louis.  There is a major league baseball game planned at Busch Stadium 
in a week; and, according to U.S. Secret Service (USSS), there is a possibility the 
President of the United States (POTUS) may attend to throw the opening pitch. 
  16
Meanwhile, the driver of the cobalt 60 shipment has stopped for the night at an 
Indiana rest stop near the Indiana and Illinois border.  He climbs into his sleeper, and 
with the help of some sleeping pills, falls fast asleep.  As many drivers often do, he leaves 
the truck tractor’s diesel engine idling and the air conditioner unit running to keep him 
cool and to drown out the noise from the traffic.  At dawn, the sun shining in his 
windshield wakes him.  He feels foggy from the sleeping pills and steps out of the rig to 
go wash his face in the rest room.  The cobalt 60 cask, which was chained to the flatbed 
trailer the night before is gone.  He dials “911”, and reports the shipment stolen.  Since 
the global positioning unit is on the trailer rather than the shipment, there is no way to 
know where the cask is. 
FBI JTTF agents in Illinois learn that an instruction manual on how to build a 
radiological dispersion device (RDD) also known as a “dirty bomb” was found in one of 
the safe houses used by this extremist group. With the prospect of a dirty bomb may be 
used by this group, FBI headquarters is notified. 
 
B. WHILE SOME STATES HAVE MORE STRINGENT SECURITY 
STANDARDS, THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SECURITY STANDARDS 
FOR NRAM ARE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE 
The hypothetical situation above portrays a dramatic fictional story.  While the 
facts are certainly fictional, the risk and vulnerability that is described is unfortunately 
quite real. 
Few can legitimately question that since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 
many great strides have been made in the effort to make our homeland more secure.  
Security measures have been carefully analyzed and improved regarding the airline 
industry, cargo shipments in our ports, the rail industry, nuclear power plants, highway 
and bridge systems, the telecommunications system, the national power grid, natural gas 
lines, and other critical infrastructure. 
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Table 1 below is intended to outline the sector that is the subject of this 
discussion. 
Table 1.   Outline of Nuclear Sector (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006) 
Nuclear Sector 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS  
A. Light Water Reactor Power Plants  
B. Other Reactor Power Plants  
RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS  
A. Government Research and Test Reactors  
B. University Research and Test Reactors  
C. Private Research and Test Reactors  
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES  
A. Uranium Mining or In Situ Uranium Leaching  
B. Uranium Ore Milling or Leachate Processing  
C. Uranium Conversion Facilities  
D. Uranium Enrichment Facilities  
E. Fuel Fabrication Facilities  
 1. Category I (Special Nuclear Materials) Facilities  
 2. Category II (Special Nuclear Materials – Moderate Strategic Significance) Facilities  
         3. Category III (Special Nuclear Materials – Low Strategic Significance) Facilities  
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT  
A. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facilities  
B. Sites Managing Accumulations of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials  
C. Spent Nuclear Fuel Processing and Storage Facilities  
        1. Spent Nuclear Fuel Wet Storage Facilities  
        2. Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Facilities 
D. Transuranic Waste Processing and Storage Facilities  
E. High-Level Radioactive Waste Storage and Disposal14 Facilities  
NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRANSPORT  
A. Low Hazard Radioactive Materials Transport  
B. High Hazard Radioactive Materials Transport  
DEACTIVATED NUCLEAR FACILITIES  
A. Deactivated Reactors  
B. Other Deactivated Nuclear Facilities  
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL USERS  
A. Medical Facilities with Radioactive Materials  
B. Research Facilities with Radioactive Materials  
C. Irradiation Facilities  
D. Industrial Facilities with Nuclear Materials  
E. Radiopharmaceutical and Medical Isotope Production Facilities  
F. Radiographers, Well Loggers, and Portable Density Gauge Users15  
RADIOACTIVE SOURCE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES  
A. Radioactive Source Importers  
B. Radioactive Source Manufacturers  
REGULATORY, OVERSIGHT, AND INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS  
A. Federal Nuclear Agencies 
B. State, Regional, and Local Nuclear Agencies 
C. Nuclear Industry Organizations 
OTHER NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
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Unfortunately, with regard to NRAM shipments there has been less focus on 
homeland security.  While many significant reforms were made with regard to nuclear 
power plants, attention upon security surrounding NRAM storage facilities and shipments 
has not received as much attention.32 
Perhaps one of the biggest challenges to discussing this topic is the various ways 
in which NRAM is categorized.  Since the terms and categories will become important, 
the following information will be of assistance. 
Source material is natural uranium or thorium or depleted uranium that is not 
suitable for reactor fuel. 
Nuclear material consists of uranium, plutonium or another substance which is 
or may be used for extraction of nuclear energy (nuclear fuel), or a compound containing 
such a substance; thorium or another substance suited for conversion into nuclear fuel, or 
a compound containing such a substance; and spent nuclear fuel which has not been 
placed in final storage. 
Fuel cycle facilities are categorized based upon the type of nuclear material 
stored or produced at the site.  Nuclear material is given different designations depending 
upon its level of enrichment and the amount of material possessed by the facility.  The  
five categories are as follows: 
 
1. Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities  
These facilities handle the highest grade of nuclear material, known as strategic 
special nuclear material (SSNM) consisting of uranium 235, uranium 233 or plutonium.  
This is also often referred to as fissile or military grade material.  Only two such 




                                                 
32 M. Bunn and G. Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Post-September 11 Threats of 
Theft and Sabotage,” Journal of Nuclear Material Management 30, no. 3 (2002): 48.  
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2. Category II Fuel Cycle Facilities  
These facilities receive, use or store SSNM of moderate amounts. 
 
3. Category III Fuel Cycle Facilities 
These facilities are permitted to receive special nuclear material (SNM) of low 
strategic significance or low quantity.  There are currently four such facilities in the U.S. 
 
4. Category III Fuel Enrichment Facilities 
Also known as gaseous diffusion plants, these facilities receive, use, or store 
natural uranium material and low quantities of SNM and typically manufacture material 
for the nuclear fuel cycle in the form of enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF – 6).  There 
is only one such facility operating in the U.S. 
 
5. Uranium Conversion Facility 
Also known as a uranium hexafluoride production facility, this facility receives, 
uses, and stores material and manufactures material in the nuclear fuel cycle in the form 
of uranium hexafluoride (UF-6) for commercial fuel enrichment.  There is currently only 
one such facility in the U.S.33 
The uranium mining and milling process is also part of the commercial NRAM 
sector at the beginning of the fuel cycle process.  At the end of the nuclear fuel process 
are the low level and high level radioactive waste disposal facilities, as well as the spent  
nuclear fuel storage facilities.  Spent nuclear fuel storage facilities come in two types, wet 
and dry storage.  Each of these categories of facilities has their own set of statutes and 
regulations pertaining to their operations including security.34 
Additionally, thirty-four states, known as agreement states, have entered into 
agreements with the NRC to regulate the possession, storage, use, processing, and 
                                                 
33 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Description of Uranium Conversion Process (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government, 2006), http://www.nrc.gov/materials.html (accessed 16 October 2006). 
34 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Description of Spent Nuclear Fuel Facilities (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government, 2006), http://www.nrc.gov/waste.html (accessed 16 October 2006). 
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transportation of NRAM.  Licenses are issued under federal regulations or by agreement 
states under equivalent state authority.  Licenses are issued for medical, academic, and 
industrial uses of nuclear materials.  Reactor-produced materials are used extensively 
throughout the U.S. for a variety of civilian, military, industrial, academic and medical 
purposes.  Both federal and state regulations are intended to ensure that those in 
possession of such materials use them in a manner consistent with public health and 
safety.35 
As NRAM is created, processed, and enriched, it must be stored and transported.  
One of the findings of this research is that this area in particular is where a terrorist bent 
on death and destruction on U.S. soil has his greatest opportunity. It is at this point in the 
nuclear process where the worst security gaps exist with regard to materials that could be 
used for terrorist purposes in our homeland.  In short, no one has the unified, operational 
responsibility. 
While in the transportation system, NRAM is generally categorized one of four 
ways based upon their radioactive levels.  Strategic special nuclear material (SSNM), 
also known as “military weapons grade”, consists of uranium-235 (contained in uranium 
enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium - 233, or plutonium, and, 
as stated before is not the subject of discussion here.  Special nuclear material (SNM) 
consists of uranium-233 or uranium-235, enriched uranium, or plutonium that is less than 
20 percent enriched.  Highway route controlled quantities (HRCQ) is NRAM  material 
below the level of SNM, yet it is relatively high in radioactivity.  Radiological material 
in quantities of concern (RAMQC) are materials of lower grade than HRCQ and 




                                                 
35 DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste.  
36 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 Part 173.435 (2007).  
  21
There are also many types of commercial NRAM stored and transported in the 
U.S.  These include General NRAM, Low Level Waste Shipments, Uranium 
Hexafluoride Shipments, Fresh Fuel Shipments, Transuranic Waste Shipments, Highway 
Route Controlled Quantity (HRCQ) Shipments, and Weapons Shipments.37  
To varying degrees, these four categories of NRAM trigger one or more of the 
following protective measures under the NRC, the DOT, the DOE or equivalent 
regulations: 
1.  Use of NRC certified shipment transportation packaging designed to 
withstand certain hypothetical accidents.  Some packages are also 
provided a limited amount of security (e.g. spent nuclear fuel package);  
2.   Advance notifications to the NRC and affected states;  
3.  Protection of shipment information as classified or sensitive unclassified 
Safeguards Information (SGI) as appropriate;  
4.   Communication between the shipper and a control center;  
5.   Escorts (armed in some cases);  
6.  Protective measures to protect against movement of a hijacked shipment 
before response forces arrive.38 
It is the consensus of the intelligence community that the potential theft of NRAM 
is key to the creation of a WMD or an RDD.39  According to some experts, while it may 
not inflict as many casualties as other explosive devices, an RDD (dirty bomb) would 
terrify the public and inflict a considerable economic blow upon the commerce of this 
country.40  Since September 11, 2001, regulatory changes have done a great deal to 
fortify our nation’s nuclear power generating facilities.  The NRC has required that plants 
be fortified with numerous additional safeguards and has required that such facilities  
 
                                                 
37  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest, 2005-2006 Edition, 2005-2006 ed., Vol. 
NUREG 1350, Volume 17 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government, 2006), 153. 
38 DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste, 99. 
39 Ibid., 81. 
40 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, 12; Conklin, “Proposed Framework for Cleanup and Site Restoration,” 
575-582. 
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regularly demonstrate their ability to thwart certain designed-based threats;41  however, 
security requirements in and around NRAM storage facilities and when NRAM is in 
transit have not received as much attention.42 
 
C. SECURITY SURROUNDING NRAM SHIPMENTS IS A “PATCHWORK 
QUILT” OF REGULATORY AGENCIES WITH GAPS AND OVERLAP 
In part, the problem is bureaucratic.  The regulatory scheme which outlines 
security measures for commercial grade NRAM storage and shipments was designed 
before September 11, 2001.  The present system is a combination of regulations falling 
under different regulatory agencies that have not yet fully adjusted to the new homeland 
security era. 
According to the coordinator of the DOE’s Radiological Assistance Program 
(RAP) for Region 5 in Chicago, the term “patchwork quilt” best describes the present 
regulatory scheme for NRAM.  She is responsible for the DOE’s NRAM security in the 
DOE region covering the Midwest states.43 
Generally, the DOT regulates shippers and carriers that carry hazardous materials 
including NRAM.  The DOT’s focus is on driver certification, vehicle safety, routing, 
shipping documentation, hazardous material training, and some packaging 





                                                 
41 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Order Requiring Compliance with Revised Design Basis 
Threat for Operating Power Reactors, Public Law EA-03-086, (2003) 1; R. Westrum, “Increasing the 
Number of Guards at Nuclear Power Plants,” Risk Analysis 24, no. 4 (August 2004): 959-961. 
42 Bunn and Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Security,” 48; R. Halstead, J. Ballard and F. Dilger, “State 
of Nevada Studies of Potential Terrorism and Sabotage against Spent Fuel Shipments,” Waste Management 
2001 Conference, Tucson, AZ, 2001. 
43 Christine Van Horn (U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Team Coordinator, 
Region V) e-mail messages to author, 17 January 2007. 
44 M/Sgt. David Beasley (Illinois State Police, Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Section), e-mail 
messages to author, 10 October 2006. 
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and use of shipping containers termed packaging.  The NRC is also responsible for 
regulating the protection of spent nuclear fuel and large quantities of radioactive material 
in transit from sabotage or theft.45 
Another key component of this subject area is protecting the information 
pertaining to NRAM security.  The NRC and the DOE jointly regulate security clearances 
to enable restricted information to be shared with those with a “need to know.”  While 
information pertaining to nuclear facilities, their protective measures, transportation 
routes, security features, response procedures, certain formula quantities, and similar 
information regarding certain types and levels of NRAM are considered unclassified, it is 
considered Safeguards Information (SGI).  Disclosure of such information to those not 
authorized is a federal offense.46  Other information pertaining to NRAM as it relates to 
national security is classified.  Through its Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 
(PCII) Program, the DHS is now also categorizing information as SGI.47 
While SGI is considered to be sensitive, unclassified information, its handling and 
protection more closely resembles the handling of classified information.  The categories 
of individuals who are permitted access to SGI are identified in Title 10 CFR Part 73.21.  
The DOE regulates the protection of the DOE radioactive waste material 
shipments.  These are typically waste materials from the DOE nuclear facilities across the 
country.  Under the Nuclear Waste Act, as amended, the NRC certifies the packaging for 
the DOE transports.  The NRC regulations require the DOE to comply with certain pre-
notifications.  All other transportation regulations for those shipments are under the 
jurisdiction of the DOE.48 
                                                 
45 F. Dilger and R. Halstead, “The Next Species of Trouble: Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation in the 
United States,” American Behavioral Scientist 46, no. 6 (February 2003): 796-811; L. Green, “Nuclear 
Transport - the Regulatory Dimension,” International Journal of Radioactive Materials Transport 13, no. 
3-4 (2002): 203-206; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Implementing Guidance for Additional 
Security Measures for Transportation of Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (2005). 
46 Atomic Energy Act, Sec. 147.; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Management Directive 12.6,” no. 12.6 (2005), http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/safeguards/phys-
protect.html (accessed 10 October 2006); U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555, 
Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information, Criteria and Guidance, NUREG- 0794, 1981.   
47 DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste, 61. 
48 Christine Van Horn, (U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Team Coordinator, 
Region V) e mail messages to author, 17 January 2007. 
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In very few instances do any of the federal regulatory agencies collaborate with 
the state and local agencies through which these materials are shipped.49 Figure 2 
illustrates how complex the NRAM transport regulations are at the present time. 
 
 
Figure 2.   NRAM transport regulations (from Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006) 
 
While this regulatory scheme may have been sufficient in the pre-September 11th 
era, it is woefully inadequate today.  Certainly no one questions the commitment and 
dedication of those within the federal agencies who oversee their respective “lanes of 
traffic” in securing NRAM commercial storage and transportation, but their primary 
perspective is with the commercial industry.   
None of these agencies have the homeland security mission.  That mission is, of 
course, the province of the DHS.  Yet, the DHS has no direct operational control over the 
security mission for these materials.  Further, until an NRAM shipment is stolen, 
                                                 
49 Christine Van Horn, (U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Team Coordinator, 
Region V). 
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triggering the involvement of law enforcement through federal, state or local agencies, no 
one agency is focused upon securing such materials from the hands of terrorists.  
Another important category of NRAM shipment is spent nuclear fuel.  
According to the NRC, spent nuclear fuel has the potential to be used in an RDD and has 
the potential of delivering a lethal radioactive dose to those exposed to it.  Using this one 
category as an example, please note in the illustrations below how regulatory 
responsibility of this one category of shipment varies under differing circumstances. 
Unfortunately, in most states these shipments move without the knowledge or 
collaboration of federal, state, and local law enforcement and often without regard to the 
presence of major events, high level dignitary visits, or suspected terrorist activity that 
may be in their path.   
One might legitimately ask if these federal agencies “approve” the routes for 
spent fuel transportation, upon what is that approval based?  This is a significant gap in 
homeland security if those approving the route for such shipments are completely 
unaware of those activities which threaten public safety.  Furthermore, who truly has 
ownership of the homeland security mission with regard to NRAM?  The term 





















































1 Per NRC/DOE Reimbursable Agreement
2  Per Nuclear Waste Policy Act
3 Per NRC/DOT Memorandum of Understanding
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Table 3.   Primary Roles in Selecting and Approving Highway Routes for Spent Fuel 
Transportation (from Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006) 
 
This fragmentation also exists with the various regulatory entities.  Under DOT 
alone there is divergence in responsibilities.  Through the Transportation of Hazardous 
Material Act, the DOT is responsible for ensuring the safety of hazardous materials 
transportation, including spent nuclear fuel and all radioactive materials.  Within the 
DOT, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), the Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have varying degrees of responsibility over 
NRAM shipment security. 50 
Additionally, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration also have partial responsibility for regulating drivers, 
carriers, and shippers of NRAM.51  
                                                 
50 Transportation of Hazardous Materials Act, Title 49 USC 5101-5127 (2004). 
51 J. A. D. Smith and J. B. Reed, Spent Fuel Transportation: History, Status and State Involvement, 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004, 80.  
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Tim Runyon, the Section Manager for the Environmental Monitoring and 
Transportation Unit at the Illinois Emergency Management Agency’s Division of Nuclear 
Safety (DNS), has been involved in Illinois’ NRAM inspection and escort program since 
1985.  According to Runyon, shortly after September 11, 2001, the NRC and the DOT 
made efforts to increase security and controls on certain types and quantities of NRAM in 
transit. As part of what was termed “interim compensatory measures”, (ICM) the NRC 
suggested that states consider security escorts for NRAM shipments at levels RAMCQ 
and above.  States were left to their own discretion to determine how they would respond 
to this somewhat ambiguous guidance.52 
Runyon advises, “The detail of the NRC orders imposed on licensees suggested 
the existence of a credible threat and that RAMCQ shipments were considered potential 
targets for individuals interested in obtaining these materials for use in a radiological 
dispersal device (RDD).  However, the lack of clear guidance from our federal partners, 
regarding the role of state and local law enforcement, has resulted in a wide range of 
responses from States and other stakeholders.”  From Runyon’s point of view, states with 
well developed radiological response programs or existing programs that have 
historically provided truck inspections and security escorts for spent nuclear fuel 
shipments have added RAMQC or the HRCQ subset to the types of shipments that they 
inspect and escort.  In many cases, fees must be imposed on shippers and carriers to 
offset the additional expense of these unfunded mandates.  However, “there is no 
consistency from State to State,” according to Runyon.  This lack of consistency is 
difficult and confusing for shippers and carriers and reduces the overall effectiveness of 
states that are involved with such shipments.53   
 
                                                 
52 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Implementing Guidance for Additional Security Measures 
for Transportation of Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately), Public Law EA-05-007, (2005); 
Tim Runyon (Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety) e mail messages to 
author, 10 December 2006.  
53 Tim Runyon, (Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety), e mail 
messages to author, 10 December 2006. 
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“A particular shipment moving across the U.S. may be inspected and escorted in 
New York, Ohio, Illinois, and California, but not in Pennsylvania, Indiana, Missouri, or 
Iowa.  It’s no great leap in logic to assume that any group interested in the use of these 
materials for malevolent acts would simply wait in a neighboring state for a shipment to 
be released from its security escort before launching an attack and commandeering the 
material,” explained Runyon.54 
“There is clearly a need for more detailed information and consistent guidance at 
the federal level.  States should also have an avenue for receipt and communication of 
credible threat information in real time.  Most important, the federal agencies including 
DOT, NRC and DHS should strive for rules or regulations that provide for consistency in 
the level of security and oversight provided for NRAM shipments as they move across 
the U.S.”, advised Runyon.55 
                                                 
54 Tim Runyon, (Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety) e mail 
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IV. STATES TAKE HOMELAND SECURITY ACTION 
In a minority of states where a number of nuclear power generating or storage 
facilities are located, the states themselves have instituted security regulations.  For some, 
these regulatory practices have been historical, dating back to when nuclear facilities 
were first built in their jurisdictions.  In others, they were instituted after September 11, 
2001.56  In no other state are the security measures more developed than in Illinois.  
Illinois has by far more nuclear facilities than any other state; at present, the state has 
eleven nuclear power generating plants, with a twelfth planned for construction.57  These 
plants are at six locations around the state.  Illinois also has two nuclear fuel storage 
facilities and the only uranium ore processing facility in the U.S. (located at Metropolis, 
Illinois).  The uranium ore processing facility is only one of five in the world, and 30% of 
the world’s supply of uranium is processed at that facility.58 
 
A. THE HISTORY AND THE WAY FORWARD IN NRAM SHIPMENT 
SECURITY - THE ILLINOIS MODEL 
Since 1979, the Illinois State Police (ISP) and the Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency’s Division of Nuclear Safety (DNS) have collaborated on NRAM 
shipment security.  Operating under state regulatory authority, the two agencies have 
partnered to maintain the safety and security of various types of mid-to high-level NRAM 
commercial shipments as they move through Illinois. 
Additionally, after September 11, 2001, by order of the Illinois Homeland 
Security Advisor Carl Hawkinson, additional categories and quantities of shipments were 
included in the security escort program, and all such measures were implemented when 
the Homeland Security Advisory System warning level is at Level Yellow or above.59 
                                                 
56 Tim Runyon, (Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety) e mail 
messages to author, 10 December 2006.  
57 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest, 2005-2006 Edition, 2005-2006 ed., Vol. 




Hawkinson, who was the longest serving State Homeland Security Advisor in the 
nation when he retired at the end of 2005, recounted, “In the first months of 2003, the 
U.S. was in the run-up to the War in Iraq.  DHS was stood up March 1, 2003.  In 2003, 
both pre-DHS and after it was established the nation went to Level Orange.  At the time 
of one or more of these alerts, there was discussion of the threat of dirty bombs.  I knew 
that Illinois was a leading state in nuclear power and through our nuclear safety people, a 
leader in the shipments of radioactive materials to, from and through our state.  This 
material, if stolen, represented a potential terrorist weapon for dirty bombs…I 
recommended to the Governor…that Illinois continue this security during “normal” 
Yellow status.  I remained and remain actively concerned with the lack of nationwide 
security for these shipments.  It does little good to secure the shipments in Illinois if they 
can be hijacked in another state and then used against targets in Illinois or other 
states…”60 
As a result of this rich history with the nuclear industry, Illinois is experienced 
with issues relating to security surrounding the storage and shipment of NRAM.  
According to a report prepared for the National Conference of State Legislatures, the 
inspection and escort program developed by Illinois is “unique,” and “the potential 
increase in NRAM shipments in the future has caused many states to look to Illinois for 
leadership as they begin to establish similar programs.”61 
Christine Van Horn, Coordinator of the DOE’s Radiological Assistance Program 
(RAP) Team for Region 5, agrees.  According to her, in Illinois the DOE has an excellent 
relationship with the state’s fusion center, the Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center 
(ST&IC), to obtain intelligence on threats, vulnerability, and special events that may have 




                                                 
60 Carl Hawkinson (Former Illinois Homeland Security Advisor and Deputy Chief of Staff for Public 
Safety, Office of the Governor), e-mail messages to author, 12 January 2007. 
61 Smith and Reed, Spent Fuel Transportation, 80.  
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group need only await the arrival of an NRAM shipment from Illinois into Iowa or 
Indiana where it is no longer protected, to hijack the load.  According to Van Horn, 
Illinois is a “model” for the nation.62 
Another strong partner and advocate for Illinois’ system is the Exelon 
Corporation, one of the nation’s largest electric and natural gas utility companies. Exelon 
has the largest fleet of nuclear power generating facilities in the U.S.  Headquartered in 
Warrenville, Illinois, the Exelon leadership team has a strong working relationship with 
both ISP and DNS.63 
The Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety (DNS), 
in collaboration with the Illinois State Police, has been engaged in regulating and 
securing such materials for over twenty-five years under the Illinois Nuclear Safety 
Act.64  As one of the states with an agreement with the NRC, by leveraging the 
TRANSCOM system, a DOE sponsored, satellite-based shipment tracking system, 
Illinois monitors shipments routed through Illinois to better estimate their arrival.65  Yet, 
there is often little interaction or collaboration with federal agencies in that process.  On a 
weekly basis, the State of Illinois meets shipments entering from neighboring states, to 
inspect and escort them.  Fully trained and equipped nuclear scientists inspect the cargo 
to ensure it is safely packaged and secured.  Fully trained and equipped Illinois State 
Police commercial vehicle enforcement officers who are certified in hazardous materials 
training inspect the driver and vehicle for compliance with federal and state 
transportation laws.  The inspection and escort team then remains with that shipment 
                                                 
62 Christine Van Horn (U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Team Coordinator, 
Region V), e-mail messages to author, 17 January 2007. 
63 Tim Runyon (Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety), e-mail 
messages to author, 10 December 2006.  
64 M/Sgt. David Beasley (Illinois State Police, Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Section), e-mail 
messages to author, 10 October 2006; Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 420, Sec. 10/1-7 (2007),  
http://www.state.il.us/iema/legal/statutes/nucpwr/nucfac.htm (accessed 10 December 2006).  
65 KS Boes and others, “TRANSCOM: The US Department of Energy (DOE) System for Tracking 
Shipments,” Conference: SPECTRUM94: International Nuclear and Hazardous Waste Management 
Conference, Atlanta, GA, 14-18 Aug 1994, http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/10160436-
iMlFhp/native/ (accessed 2 December 2006). 
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throughout the state.  The routes that are approved take into account major events, present 
threat intelligence from the state’s fusion center, and highway and weather conditions. 
Yet those shipments typically arrive and depart the state with no security in the 
adjacent states, and often with little in the way of electronic monitoring.  Worse, in many 
cases within the neighboring states, stakeholders at the state and local level are 
completely unaware of the NRAM’s presence in their jurisdictions. 
Until the fall of 2005, security at the eleven nuclear power generating stations was 
strong but in need of improvement.66  As a result of new Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) standards which took effect in October, 2005, those facilities are 
now well fortified for all but the most exceptional of terrorist threats67  Some facilities, 
however, are not power generating stations and fall outside the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s (NRC) new stronger security requirements which became effective 
October 1, 2005.  Thus, they have far less security around them than the nuclear power 
generating stations.  This includes nuclear storage facilities, reactors used for medical and 
scientific research, and the uranium ore processing plant owned by Honeywell 
Corporation in Metropolis, Illinois (near the Illinois and Kentucky border on the Ohio 
River). 
According to the DNS, the Honeywell facility is the only U.S. source for 
processed uranium ore needed for nuclear power generating stations and is among only 
five such facilities in the world.  Should a fire occur at this facility, radioactive 
contaminants could become airborne across much of southeast Illinois and northern 
Kentucky, as well as the Ohio River, yet it doesn’t even appear on the following NRC 
map.   
 
                                                 
66 Tim Runyon (Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety), e-mail 




Figure 3.   Nuclear Facilities (from Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2005) 
 
As Figure 3 depicts, nuclear power generating facilities are abundant in the U.S.; 
however, in no state are there more nuclear facilities than in Illinois.  According to the 
DOE, one in five homes are powered by electricity generated from just over one hundred 
nuclear facilities in the U.S.68  As shown in the figure above, many of these sites are in 
heavily populated areas. 
 
B. THE HEARTLAND IS THE CROSSROADS FOR THE U.S. 
Another reason Illinois has stepped up its NRAM security measures is its location 
as  a major transportation hub for air passenger and freight, rail, and water transportation.  
Since it is located in the heartland of America, many of our nation’s major transportation 
networks cross through Illinois.  Illinois has one of the busiest airports in the U.S. at 
O’Hare International Airport in Chicago.  Illinois also has the largest railroad hub in the 
country in Chicago.69  A short distance south of Chicago is the Centerpoint Inter-modal 
facility which is the largest inter-modal rail facility in the U.S. and the third largest in the 
                                                 
68 U.S. Department of Energy, Sources of Electric Power (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government, 2006), 
http://www.doe.gov/energysources/electricpower.htm (accessed 10 February 2006). 
69 Robert Bensko (Illinois Commerce Commission) interview by author, Springfield, Illinois, 2 
February 2007. 
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world.70  By water, Illinois connects the Great Lakes waterway system with the 
Mississippi, Ohio, and Illinois river systems.  Currently nuclear fuel and radioactive 
materials cross through Illinois on a weekly basis through all these modes of 
transportation.  According to the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), high 
grade NRAM shipments come through Illinois over two hundred times each year.  Mid- 
to lower-level radioactive shipments pass through the state on a daily basis.  These 
shipments come through at varying radioactive levels, and with varying degrees of safety 
precautions. 
 
C. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN 
An issue that has a significant impact on NRAM security is the storage of spent 
nuclear fuel.  Facilities nationwide are presently holding their spent nuclear fuel or are 
finding interim storage facilities until Congress determines if Yucca Mountain in Nevada 
will be used as a national storage facility.  The DOE estimates with the opening of the 
Yucca Mountain storage site, highly radioactive cargo would travel through a total of 45 
states at a rate of about 2,200 additional truck shipments per year, or 450 additional rail 
shipments annually, depending on the mode chosen.  Many of those shipments must pass 
through Illinois.71 
According to the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), approximately 
2,000 NRAM shipments move within or through Illinois annually.  Over 50 shipments, or 
slightly over one per week, are escorted with a state police and nuclear science team each 
year.  If Yucca Mountain opens for NRAM storage, that number will likely double.72 
 
                                                 
70 Thomas Korty (Policy and Safety Manager, Illinois Department of Transportation) interview by 
author, Springfield, Illinois, 7 June 2006. 
71 Environmental Working Group Action Fund, Will Terrorists Target Nuclear Waste Shipments? 
Environmental Working Group Action Fund, 
http://www.ewg.org/reports/nuclearwaste/faq/faq_terroristthreat_more.php (accessed 10 February 2006). 
72 Korty interview. 
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V. THE SOLUTION 
There needs to be a single, comprehensive strategy with regard to security of 
NRAM during storage and shipment.  That strategy must have a focus upon homeland 
security and must be multi-disciplinary in nature.  The present “patchwork quilt” of 
regulatory oversight must be converted to a single, uniform network of federal, state, and 
local stakeholders with a common mission and operating picture. 
Under the proposed solution, the future strategy for NRAM storage and 
transportation security would work much differently than it does today in many states. 
 
A. THE NEED FOR A MULTI LEVEL HOMELAND SECURITY EFFORT 
IN NRAM – A LOOK AT HOW OTHER COUNTRIES HANDLE 
COMMERCIAL NRAM 
Unlike many countries that have a national police force, there appears to be  
tension between federal and state / local authorities in the U.S. in homeland security 
efforts.  Police in the U.S. are also less familiar with addressing international terrorism on 
their own soil as law enforcement in some other countries.73  The Israeli model of 
national police is well known and need not be detailed here; but that model is not 
practical in the U.S. since states and U.S. territories have sovereignty under the U.S. 
Constitution.  Yet, can something be learned from the manner in which other nations 
protect their commercial NRAM? 
The security measures surrounding NRAM are not a topic widely publicized by 
most governments; therefore, gaining access to specific information about how other 
countries deal with this issue is quite difficult. While Russia is widely criticized for its 
lack of tight security surrounding its nuclear military weapons, Russia may have some 
security practices worth noting with regard to its commercial NRAM. 
Vladimir Sergevnin served in the Russian military and in the Russian police.  He 
began his law enforcement career in 1977 as a Second Lieutenant in Ministry of Internal 
                                                 
73 Dennis Bridges, “It's a Police Problem: The Terrorist Threat's Impact on State and Local Law 
Enforcement,” Police Chief 69, no. 2 (February 2002): 35. 
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Affairs of the USSR, which he described as the equivalent of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police in Russia.  The unit in which he worked had both federal and state 
authority. He had many assignments including the Special Forces unit during the 1980 
Olympic Games, border security, 12th International Youth Festival, President Boris 
Yeltsin’s security detail, and others.  He retired at the rank of Colonel in 2002.  He 
presently works with the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board 
Executive Institute as the research manager and editor of their research publications.74 
According to Mr. Sergevnin, Russian police are integrally involved in security 
measures surrounding commercial NRAM shipments.  Most of these shipments are the 
responsibility of the state police in Russia, under the guidance of the Ministry of Nuclear 
and Atomic Energy (Minatom) and the Ministry of the Interior (MVD).  There are 89 
states in Russia, and police are responsible for securing the shipment along the highways 
as it moves from state to state.  Police are in uniform and are typically armed with both 
handguns and AK-47 rifles.  Such escorts will typically carry a red flag denoting a 
security escort and may have a traffic police placard on them. 
Mr. Sergevnin explained that the plans for movement of NRAM are overseen by 
the Minatom, which oversees the safety arrangements; Federal Security Service (FSB), 
which provides intelligence security; and the MVD, which arranges police security along 
the highways, railways, river ways and sea.  Such shipments are tracked and monitored 
electronically, as well as escorted.  The security teams are in constant contact with 
authorities to maintain situational awareness of the shipments.  While local police may 
stop and inquire as to the nature of the shipment and may demand to see identification 
and shipment papers, local police are not permitted to inspect the shipment itself due to 
safety concerns.75   
If other countries such as Russia can deploy procedures that better secure 
commercial NRAM during transportation across its many states, why can’t the U.S.?  
Through efforts by Congress to help better secure NRAM in other countries under the 
                                                 
74 Col. Vladimir Sergevnin (Ret.) (Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board) interview 
by author, Springfield, Illinois, 2 August 2006. 
75 Ibid. 
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1991 Nunn-Lugar Act, we are seeking to help ensure that the U.S. is more secure.76  For 
example, in one recent effort the Russian government in conjunction with the U.S. 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) removed highly dangerous NRAM 
from a troubled area of Chechnya under armed security, to be stored in a secure facility.  
There was reportedly enough material to make up to five RDD’s or dirty bombs.77 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) argues that national standards 
in each country are inadequate, as they are dependent upon that individual country’s 
economics, political make-up, international standing, and other factors.  They argue that 
to attack the problem one nation at a time through international agreements is ineffective 
and depends upon the stability of that government to meet its commitments in the long 
term.  Accordingly, the argument is made that a single international standard should be 
developed that all countries would agree to follow. While the IAEA works toward 
establishing a minimum safety standard, in the view of some this goal is unlikely to be 
achieved due to the wide disparity in economic capabilities and political interest in the 
issue.78  Nonetheless, the IAEA continues to strive toward model security policies for all 
nations involved in the nuclear fuel cycle.79   
Clearly, it is easy to understand the challenges with improving security measures 
of NRAM in other countries, but what about the NRAM within the U.S.?  Is the U.S. 
really doing all it should within its own borders? 
One might assume that improving NRAM security within the U.S. should be a 
much easier task than doing so in a foreign country.  As the agency charged with the 
responsibility to oversee the nation’s critical infrastructure and national assets, the DHS 
                                                 
76 Allison, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy. 
77 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of David 
Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006, 
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/congressional/2006/2006-03-28_David_Huizenga_testimony.pdf (accessed 
10 September 2006). 
78 Jenkins, “Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” 98. 
79 International Atomic Energy Agency, Mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna, 
Austria 2006), http://www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/Announcements.asp?ConfID=147 (accessed 17 
September 2006). 
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should be given the clear lead role to pull together a more comprehensive system to 
secure NRAM both while it is being stored and while it is being transported.  Also, 
collaboration between the various layers of the federal, state, and local government must 
be strengthened so all the agencies have a common operating picture.  This includes 
expanding the use of technology to track and monitor NRAM.  Finally, state and local 
governments must be brought into the overall strategy as they are in Illinois.  This will 
ensure that all key stakeholders have situational awareness (SA) and are quickly sharing 
intelligence on changes in the levels of threat and vulnerability with regard to the security 
of NRAM. 
 
B. BENCHMARKING – WHAT IS THE VISION? 
Since true benchmarking is setting forth the vision of where we hope to go the 
following illustration is appropriate. 
Hypothetical Scenario 
A shipment of a large quantity of cobalt 60, a potentially deadly radioactive 
material, is being shipped by a company in Canada to the Port of Los Angeles, where it 
will be loaded on a ship to be taken to China, a common pathway for this material.  The 
contractor hired to move the material does so with a conventional tractor/trailer.  The 
trip will take several days, and states through which the shipment will move all receive 
written notice through a new DHS unit that coordinates security for such materials.  At 
every point along the way, state and/or local law enforcement maintain a presence either 
by escorting the shipment, appearing at bridge overpasses, or by patrol visibility along 
the interstate route.  At no time is the shipment out of the line of sight of one or more law 
enforcement officers.  Where practical, air assets are used by law enforcement to 
maintain constant surveillance of the shipment and the road ahead.  This is not taxing on 
any specific agency, and only takes a few minutes for any one officer.  Fire departments 
in the areas through which the shipment is passing have their hazmat teams on a ready 
status.  It is excellent training for them and provides them the opportunity to hone their 
skills in handling a nuclear / radiological incident.   
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Radiological assistance teams, equipped and trained within each state through 
DHS training grants, are on alert and ready to respond if needed.  They are state assets, 
stationed in each region of the state through which these shipments are commonly 
transported.  These teams also participate in multi-jurisdictional training exercises in 
their regions throughout the year to increase preparedness for responding to a nuclear / 
radiological incident. 
Costs associated with equipment and manpower incurred by the states are 
defrayed in part due to a homeland security fee assessed upon the commercial shipper of 
the NRAM, enabling states to receive reimbursement for the expenses incurred for this 
heightened security.  Should an incident occur requiring an actual response, the 
commercial shipper must bear the cost of response and clean up.  
In terms of communications, electronic tracking devices are placed on the 
commercial vehicle as well as the NRAM package itself, which has  two devices, one of 
which is covert.  The latest technology provides a tracking signal monitored by the DHS 
National Operation Center, as well as the individual states through which the shipment is 
moving.  In addition, federal regulation requires the commercial vehicle driver to have 
an encrypted 800 mhz radio that is interoperable across states and check in periodically 
with state and local law enforcement involved in the security detail.  This same 
communication system enables local stakeholders from all disciplines to coordinate their 
preparedness and response. 
As soon as each state receives notice of the shipment and route of travel, the state 
intelligence fusion center logs the route and provides a security analysis to the state’s 
homeland security coordinator. The coordinator reviews the following factors. 
• Major events planned in the area of the route 
• FBI JTTF and local terrorism investigations presently underway which 
may impact the proposed route of the shipment 
• Threat intelligence to include criminal activity, domestic or international 
terrorism activity which may impact the proposed route 
• Weather and road conditions that may have some bearing on the proposed 
route 
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Once the intelligence report has been reviewed by the state’s homeland security 
advisor and any adjustments to the route have been made, it is approved by the state’s 
homeland security advisor to enter the state.  Fusion centers in the states through which 
the shipment is expected to travel communicate through the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) to ensure situational awareness is maintained.  If at any 
time it is determined that a potential threat to public safety exists with regard to the 
shipment, the state coordinator may direct that the shipment 1) not enter the state; or 2) 
take a different route through the state; or 3) be secured within the state until it is safe for 
it to continue on its way. 
As the shipment passes through each area of the state, public health officials are 
aware and ensure regional hospitals have the necessary trained and qualified staff 
readily available, should an incident occur requiring a medical response.  In addition, 
state emergency management professionals ensure that response resources including 
those with decontamination capability are at the ready. 
The above scenario may at first sound unrealistic.  In fact, in several states like 
Illinois it is easily possible.  Given its present level of capabilities, Illinois could 
implement just such a plan, provided the proper federal framework is in place to support 
it. In some other states which have chosen to implement state regulations, it is quite 
achievable. 80   
How would such a strategy be achievable?  In many cases, those states and local 
communities in which NRAM is stored or through which NRAM is transported are well 
aware of the potential threat to homeland security.  For many states through which 
NRAM is already moving in high numbers, officials are already attempting to address 
this problem at a local level.  What is needed is a national framework with which state 
and local stakeholders may link a state and local strategy.  In some states like Illinois, the 
NRAM presence is so prominent that the states have constructed a framework on their 
own out of a sense of urgency for public safety. 
 
                                                 
80 Runyon e-mail. 
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Figure 4 below depicts the key points of this proposal. 
 
Figure 4.   Key Points 
 
Through the development of federal, state, local, and private stakeholder 
collaboration, security threats and vulnerabilities can be more effectively analyzed.  By 
closing security gaps for NRAM shipments and raising the collective situational 
awareness of the key homeland security stakeholders, public safety is greatly enhanced. 
 
C. SWOT ANALYSIS 
 
Internal Strengths   
Strength Description Options for Preserving or 
Enhancing 
• Model framework 
is already in 
existence at the 
federal level and 
within some states 
• With proper 
leadership and 
guidance at the 
federal level, state 
and major cities 
could fall in under a 
new national policy 
rather easily 
• Equip and train state 
and local partners 
• Under proper 
guidance and 
direction partners at 
state and local level 
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• Build on present 
momentum of post 
9/11 era to form 
collaboration   
Internal Weaknesses   
Weakness Description Options for Minimizing or 
Overcoming 
• Which federal 
agency will take 
“ownership” of the 
mission?  
• Will there be 
adequate funding to 
fulfill the mission? 
• Gaining the buy in 
and support of the 
other federal 
agencies 
• Gaining the trust 
and rapport with 
state and local 
partners to carry 
out the mission 
effectively 
Self Explanatory • Logical choice is for 
DHS to take the lead 
for this mission, and 
provide funding and 
guidance to the 
NRC, DOT, and 
other stakeholders 
• Other federal 
agencies will suffer 
budgetary cutbacks 
if they do not 
partner and 
collaborate with 




Opportunity Description Options for Taking 
Advantage 
• Form a “One Team 
/ One Fight” 
Approach to 
Homeland Security 
• Consistent with the 
overall effort to 
develop national 
capabilities 
• Consistent with the 
NIMS and ICS 
Strategy 
• Enables Congress 
to focus a strategy 
across the nation 
down to the local 
level for maximum 
capability 
• At present the 
mission is 
fragmented and in 
most states non-
existent 
• Self Explanatory 
 
 
• Self Explanatory 
 
 
• Self Explanatory 
• Selling point to 
Congress, state and 




External Challenges   
Challenge   
• Budget / Funding 
• Additional 
Personnel 
• State and local 




• Congress may be 
reluctant to establish 
and maintain  
funding 
• Educate Congress, 
state legislatures, 






Table 4.   SWOT Analysis 
 
As the SWOT analysis shows, there are many facets to consider with the proposed 
solution.  Statutory and regulatory changes at the federal level will be the first hurdle.  
Obtaining adequate funding to stand up and maintain this initiative may be the most 
challenging.  Obtaining buy in from the private sector industries that will be affected by 
the proposal so they will support the necessary changes will be essential, otherwise 
Congressional resistance my result from lobbying efforts by private industry if buy in to 
the proposal is not fully established. 
 
D. STRATEGIC ISSUES 
1. What would a national NRAM security strategy look like, and how would 
it be implemented across the states and U.S. territories? 
2. How will members of Congress be convinced this is critical to the national 
homeland security strategy? 
3. How are states and U.S. territories educated on the issue sufficiently to 
gain their buy in and support without also educating those who may be 
planning a terrorist act? 
4. What classification will the intelligence have when it is pushed out to state 
and local entities in this mission? 
5. What level of funding will be needed to make this a reality? 
6. While some states can readily adopt this framework, others which have no 




E. THE PRESENT FEDERAL MODEL VERSUS THE ILLINOIS MODEL 
Figure 5 illustrates the multiple benefits to adopting the Illinois model.  In all 
categories there is value added to homeland security and public safety. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Comparison of the Present Federal NRAM Security Aspects to the Illinois 
Model 
 
F. WHO ARE THE KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN THIS PROPOSAL? 
Key stakeholders in this proposal include the following:  
1. Congressional and legislative leadership within those states who will be 
most effected under this plan, most notably those states through which the 
highest number of NRAM shipments pass on an annual basis. 
2. Public safety leadership in those high traffic states for NRAM.  
3. Leadership of the DHS, the NRC, the DOE, the DOT and other federal 
agencies whose legislative and regulatory mandates touch this vital area.  
4. Leadership of the major industries who are the largest producers, 
processors, and shippers of NRAM.  
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VI. POLICY OPTIONS 
A. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO IS AN INVITATION FOR 
TERRORISTS 
Obviously, one policy option is to maintain the status quo.  This option presents a 
myriad of concerns.  On the economic side of the equation, the detonation of a dirty 
bomb in a highly populated, major city would be very costly in terms of injury and death, 
property damage, and interruption of commerce.  Experts agree the effected area would 
be rendered contaminated and uninhabitable from the effects of radiation for a significant 
period of time.81 
But, as serious as the economic effects would be, the political and public reaction 
would likely be even more significant.  Once such an incident has occurred on U.S. soil, 
the landscape will have changed in America just as it did after September 11th, 2001.  No 
longer would international or U.S. citizens be as eager to visit major cities.  It is well 
recognized that the terror caused by such an incident and the fear of future ones would 
linger for years.82  This could turn a vibrant, popular city such as Chicago or New York 
into a much different environment where only those who had to travel into the city for 
essential business would do so.  Once a major city in the U.S. is hit in this manner, 
nothing would ever be the same. 
All of this makes the cost of inaction substantial.  While at this point the costs of 
implementing various options may be high, they pale in comparison to the costs of 
inaction should terrorists choose to strike with an improvised nuclear bomb or RDD.  
Given the gravity of the threat in this situation, the tipping point for decision making 
should be readily apparent.  The potential implications of an improvised nuclear bomb 
being detonated in a major city are profound. 
                                                 
81 Dr. Harvey Drucker, (Argonne National Laboratory) e mail messages to author, 16 February 2006; 
DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste; Conklin, “Proposed Framework for Cleanup and Site 
Restoration,” 575-582. 
82 Dodd, “International Efforts in Countering Radiological Terrorism,” 556-565 (accessed 17 
February 2006); Kathleen McDonald and W. Sean McLaughlin, First Responders: Ready or Not?, Law 
Enforcement Trainer (May/June 2003): 14; S.V. Musolino and F.T. Harper, “Emergency Response 
Guidance for the First 48 Hours after the Outdoor Detonation of an Explosive Radiological Dispersal 
Device, Health Physics (April 2006): 377-385. 
  48
B. THE 2006 DRAFT PLAN BY DHS IS INCOMPLETE AND DOES NOT GO 
FAR ENOUGH 
The proposed comprehensive strategy in this thesis has two key elements.  First, 
there must be a single, clearly stated national security policy for commercial NRAM with 
one agency, preferably the DHS, as the lead.  Second, that plan must be multi-
disciplinary in nature, involving the relevant federal, state, local, and private sector 
stakeholders who all share a common operating picture.  This vertical and horizontal 
collaboration will ensure our nation’s NRAM assets are substantially more secure than 
they are today. 
As Table 5 below illustrates, presently the federal approach to NRAM security 
seems to rely largely upon federal stakeholders.  There is an absence of any significant 
multi-disciplinary collaboration both horizontally and vertically.  The 2002 National 
Strategy for Homeland Security clearly describes the need for cooperation between 
federal, state and local governments.  This cooperation must be established both 







































Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* No No No 
Inspections No No No No Yes No No No 
Security 
Escort 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Tracking Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
 
Table 5.   Summary of Federal Requirements by NRAM Category 
 
*Except for a few states, such notifications often do not trigger any additional precautions 
or state action that would enhance homeland security.  Actions vary among states.  
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In June, 2006, the DHS issued a draft plan for comment called, “Nuclear 
Reactors, Materials and Waste for Critical Infrastructure Protection As Input to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan.”83 This draft plan is a great start in the steps 
necessary to move NRAM security regulations into the new homeland security era.  At 
first blush, the proposed plan appears to identify the key issues and acknowledges the 
criticality of all aspects of the nuclear and radiological systems and processes.  Further, 
the plan also seems to recognize the need for better collaboration. 
Among the stated goals for the draft plan are collaboration and communication 
with “all stakeholders”; the prevention of NRAM from being used “for malevolent” 
purposes; and coordinating federal, state, and local agencies to develop tactics to “deter, 
detect, and prevent terrorist attacks.”84  The plan readily acknowledges that all types of 
nuclear facilities including those which store, process, or produce NRAM are a part of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR).  The draft plan lists the 
following as being an integral part of the nation’s CI/KR. 
1. Nuclear Power Plants  
2. Research and Test Reactors  
3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities  
4. Radioactive Waste Management  
5. Nuclear Materials Transport  
6. Deactivated Nuclear Facilities  
7. Radioactive Material Users  
8. Radioactive Source Production and Distribution Facilities  
9. Regulatory, Oversight and Industry Organizations  
10. Other Nuclear Facilities85 
The draft plan points out that the NRC is taking steps to tighten up security 
surrounding risk significant NRAM. The draft points out the “Energy Policy Act of  
 
 
                                                 
83 DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste. 
84 Ibid., 6. 
85 Ibid., 16. 
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2005” has now expanded fingerprinting and background checks for those seeking 
licenses or certifications to possess NRAM which will be a tremendous help.  Further, the 
NRC is revising its regulations to better track NRAM in quantities of concern.86 
However, the draft plan seems to focus upon four principal stakeholders.  They 
are the DHS, the DOT, the NRC and the FBI.  This federal centric approach is precisely 
the core of the problem.  Further, it seems to overlook one of the key players in NRAM 
security, the DOE.  The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) is the equivalent 
to a nuclear tactical team providing a nationwide response.87  Second, the plan also seems 
to assume that state and local agencies are not presently engaged in, equipped, or trained 
for the NRAM security mission.  As was outlined earlier, many states through which 
NRAM is shipped on a regular basis have built strong capabilities in the interests of 
public safety.  
Additionally, citing Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7, the draft 
plan asserts that the DHS is responsible for the protection of the nuclear reactors, 
materials and waste sector through its Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness and Protection 
Division (CNPPD).  However, the draft plan then readily acknowledges the numerous 
lanes of responsibility held by various agencies including the NRC which has the 
authority to regulate reactors, materials and waste pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA) of 1954, as amended.88 
To address the problem of NRAM security, the proposed policy option is to 
establish a national standard covering all NRAM shipments that carry material of a level 
lethal enough to pose a threat if used by terrorists in a nuclear or radiological improvised 
explosive device (IED).  While most high grade NRAM shipments sponsored by the DoD 
or the DOE receive stringent security, in most states a majority of mid-level NRAM 
shipments go largely unprotected and unmonitored, despite the fact that such material is 
                                                 
86 DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste, 63; See also United States Code, Title 10 CFR Part 
110. 
87 Van Horn e-mails. 
88 DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste, 20. 
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highly hazardous.89  Under this proposal, federal regulations would require that NRAM 
shipments over a certain level have electronic monitoring and armed escort.  Security 
monitoring and armed escorts for mid-range NRAM shipments are only occurring in a 
handful of states.  Illinois is among the most stringent. 
In 1983 Illinois established the Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Waste 
Inspection and Escort Program.  So far, only eight delays in shipments have occurred due 
to carrier violations.  No transportation related accidents have occurred.  The pace of this 
escort program is steadily increasing.  While in the late 1990’s there were less than a 
dozen such escorts per year.  Today these escorts occur on a weekly basis.  If the 
proposed site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada is opened for operation, this number could 
double.90 
According to the DHS DNDO, Illinois is among only five states that provide this 
level of security for the mid-range NRAM shipments, and at present Illinois is a “model” 
for the nation.91  But how effective is it to escort these shipments from the Indiana border 
to the Iowa border when neither of those states have such security measures?  The answer 
is obvious.  A patient terrorist need only wait to for the shipment to reach Iowa City, then 
hijack the load to deploy a dirty bomb in downtown Chicago. 
Further research is needed to explore other options, which may exist.  However, 
given the potential threat to NRAM in the U.S. it is difficult to imagine that any option 
would not include some aspects of this proposal.   
 
C. CRITERIA FOR JUDGING SUCCESS 
One criterion with which to judge the success of security with NRAM storage and 
shipments is through exercises.  Another would be security assessments similar to those 
presently conducted by DHS at nuclear power generating facilities, involving federal,  
 
                                                 
89 Runyon e-mails. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid.  
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state, and local first responders to gauge the effectiveness of security.  Is it stronger? Are 
communications between agencies interoperable and effective? What are the response 
times?  Are there gaps?  Are training or equipment deficiencies apparent? 
In the absence of actual terrorist threats, security effectiveness could be measured 
through table top, functional, or full scale exercises.  Of course, it is understood that a 
balance must be reached between security and impeding commerce for the private sector.  
Another possible measure could be impact the newly imposed policy has on the amount 
of suspicious activity reports that are submitted related to NRAM.  A significant shift in 
reporting could be a strong indicator that situational awareness has been improved. 
To be sure, this undertaking to stand up a national framework that involves 
federal, state, local and private stakeholder collaboration will be challenging.  Most 
worthwhile efforts are.  However, given the implications of NRAM being used against 
citizens within the U.S. such a course of action is worthy of serious consideration. 
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APPENDIX A.  SUMMARY OF ILLINOIS INSPECTION, ESCORT, 
SECURITY AND TRACKING 
Requirements by Material Category 
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Pre-notification – 7 day advance notification to governor’s designee required by 
NRC 10 CFR 71.97 
Inspection – Commercial Vehicle Safety Act (CVSA) Level VI inspection at 
point of origin or point of entry92 
Security Escort – Required by NRC 10 CFR 73.37 and NRC’s interim 
compensatory measures (ICM) issued by NRC 12-01 require escorts for entire route. 
Background Checks – Required by 49 CFR for CDL with Hazmat endorsement 
and by NRC Additional Security Measures (ASM) issued by NRC 11-04. 
Tracking – NRC Additional Security Measures and orders to licensees, requires 
telemetry or active monitoring by a communications center. 
 
Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Pre-notification – 7 day advance notification.  DOE orders are intended to 
parallel, at a minimum, the NRC 10 CFR 71.97. 
Inspection – CVSA Level VI inspection at point of origin or point of entry. 
Security Escort – Required by NRC 10 CFR 73.37, and DOE orders. 
Background Checks – Required by 49 CFR for Commercial Drivers License with 
Hazmat endorsement and by NRC Additional Security Measures. 
Tracking – DOE’s TRANSCOM satellite tracking system. 
Highway Route Controlled Quantities ( HRCQ) 
                                                 
92 Illinois Nuclear Safety Act, ,Illinois Compiled Statutes Chap. 420-Sec. 10/1 (2006). 
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Pre-notification – 7 day advance notification required by NRC orders and 
Additional Security Measures. 
Inspection – CVSA Level VI point of origin or point of entry (Illinois). 
Security escort – Recommended but optional according to NRC.  Required in 
Illinois when the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) is at Level Yellow or 
Above. 
Background Checks – Required by 49 CFR for CDL with Hazmat endorsement 
and by NRC orders. 
Tracking – NRC orders require telemetry or active monitoring by a 
communications center. 
 
NRC Quantities of Concern (QC) 
Pre-notification – 7 day advance notification required by NRC orders. 
Inspection – Periodic enroute inspections by Illinois State Police or by joint DNS 
/ ISP teams. 
Security escort - None 
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APPENDIX B.  THREAT TABLE (FROM CENTER FOR 
PROLIFERATION STUDIES WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 









Unspecified Nuclear A leaked intelligence 
report states that Bin 
Ladin allegedly paid 
over two million British 
Pounds to a middle-man 
in Kazakhstan for a 
“suitcase” bomb. 
8/16/1998 Israeli military 
intelligence 
sources 
Marie Colvin, “Holy 
War with US in his 
Sights,” Times 
(London), 16 August 
1998 
Unspecified Nuclear Bin Ladin is supposedly 
engaged in a 
comprehensive plan to 
acquire nuclear 
weapons, and 
reportedly has given a 
group of Chechens $30 
million in cash and two 















Riyad 'Alam al-Din, 
“Report Links Bin 
Ladin, Nuclear 
Weapons,” Al-Watan 
al-Arabi, 13 November 





Unspecified Biological Associates of Bin Ladin 
are reported to have 
bought anthrax and 
plague from arms 










Age, 4 June 2000 
Unspecified Nuclear/ 
Radiological 
Bin Ladin allegedly 
sends envoys to several 
Eastern European 
countries to purchase 
enriched uranium. 
These efforts reportedly 
were both unsuccessful 
and very costly for the 
organization. 
12/24/2000 “Arab security 
sources” 
“Arab Security Sources 
Speak of a New 
Scenario for 
Afghanistan: Secret 
Roaming Networks that 
Exchange Nuclear 
Weapons for Drugs,” 










Unspecified Nuclear / 
Radiological 
Bin Ladin allegedly 
obtains seven enriched 
uranium rods, which 
were supposedly US-









“Does Bin Ladin Really 
Possess Weapons of 
Mass Destruction? Tale 
of Russian Mafia Bosfs 
Simion Mogilevich 
Who Supplied Bin 
Ladin With the Nuclear 
'Dirty Bomb.'“ Al-
Majallah (London), 25 
November 2001 
Unspecified Nuclear / 
Biological / 
Chemical 
Two Pakistani scientists 
allegedly share nuclear, 
biological, and 
chemical weapons 
information with Bin 
Ladin, and thereby 
learn of radiological 
material given to him 
by the Islamic 
Movement of 
Uzbekistan. They tell 
Bin Ladin that there is 
insufficient material for 













“Toby Harnden, “Rogue 
Scientists Gave bin 
Laden Nuclear Secrets,”
Daily Telegraph 
(London), 13 December 
2001; Peter Baker, 
“Pakistani Scientist 
Who Met Bin Laden 
Failed Polygraphs, 
Renewing Suspicions,” 
Washington Post, 3 
March 2002; Susan B. 
Glasser and Kamran 
Khan, “Pakistan 
Continues Probe of 
Nuclear Scientists,” 
Washington Post, 14 
November 2001 
Unspecified Biological The Kabul office of 
Pakistani scientist 
Mehmood is reportedly 
found to contain 
documents indicating 
an interest in anthrax, 
including calculations 
concerning the aerial 
dispersal of anthrax via 
balloon, and an 
Associated Press photo 
showed something at 
the anthrax vaccine 
laboratory described as 
“anthrax spore 
concentrate”. 
11/28/2001 The Economist “Sketches of anthrax 
bomb found in 
Pakistani scientist's 










Unspecified Chemical / 
Biological 
The 11th volume of al-
Qa`ida's 5,000-page 
Encyclopedia of Jihad 
is devoted to how to 
construct CBW.  
6/23/2002 al-Qa`ida text: 
Encyclopedia 
of Jihad 
“Osama Bin Laden's bid 
to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction 
represents the greatest 
threat that Western 
Civilization has faced,” 
Mail on Sunday 
(London), 23 June 2002
Unspecified Chemical CNN correspondent 
Mike Boettcher reports 
that coalition 
intelligence agencies 
have detected several 
recent purchases of 





“Wolf Blitzer Reports,” 
CNN, 31 July 2002 
Unspecified Radiological British intelligence 
discovered documents 
in western Afghanistan 
which suggest that al-
Qa`ida members built a 
dirty bomb in 
Afghanistan. British 
officials also claim that 
the Taliban provided 
medical isotopes to al-
Qa`ida members to help 
construct the bomb. 
U.S. officials cannot 
substantiate this claim. 
1/30/2003 British 
Government 
Ed Johnson, “Report: 
Al-Qaida Made Bomb 
in Afghanistan,” 









about production plans 
for chemical and 
biological weapons. 
According to captured 
documents, certain 
members of al-Qa`ida 
had plans and the 
requisite material to 
manufacture cyanide 
and two biological 
toxins, and were close 





Qaida Near Biological, 
Chemical Arms 
Production,” 










Unspecified Biological Al-Qa'ida operatives 
allegedly planned to 






“unspecified poison” to 
Afghan nationals who 
were hired as cooks for 
U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan. The 
incident has been tied to 
the January 2003 arrest 
of 11 al-Qa'ida suspects 
in Britain who were 
reportedly in possession 
of the biological toxin 
ricin. Some sources also 
indicate that the group 
Ansar al-Islam was 
involved in this plot to 




James Gordon, “Feds 
Find Poison Plot vs. 
Gulf Troops,” Daily 
News, 10 February 
2003; Mike Toner, 
“Humble Bean 
Produces a Deadly 
Toxin,” Cox News 




A publication posted by 
members of al-Qa`ida 
on the internet included 
an article by 'Abd al-
'Aziz al-Muqrin (Abu 
Hajir), a leading al-
Qa`ida fugitive in Saudi 
Arabia, which called for 
supporters to use 
nuclear and biological 
weapons in attacks 





Base of the 
Vanguard” 
posted on the 
internet 
“Counter-Insurgency in 
the Middle East,” 
Middle East Newsline 
Morning Report, 19 
January 2004, Vol.6, 
No. 23. 
Unspecified Chemical U.S. Government 
officials announced that 
a group of al-Qa'ida 
members along with 
Zarqawi established a 
weapons lab in Kirma, 
Iraq. The lab was to be 





Terrorist Attacks in 
Iraq,” NBC Nightly 









Unspecified Nuclear In a secret interview 
with Pakistani journalist 
Hamid Mir, Ayman al-
Zawahiri allegedly 
claimed that al-Qa'ida 
possessed nuclear 
weapons purchased in 
Central Asia. Zawahiri 




[and] countries in 
Central Asia” in order 
to purchase “portable 
nuclear material.” 
3/3/2004 Hamid Mir Max Delany, “Under 
Attack al-Qaeda Makes 
Nuclear Claim,” The 





According to the 9/11 
Commission, al-Qa'ida 
operatives in 
Afghanistan prior to the 
9/11 attacks were 
considering ways of 
using WMD, including 
mustard and cyanide, 
against Jews in Iran, 
“forcing Russian 
sceintists to fire a 
nuclear-armed missile 
at the U.S.”, and using 
air conditioning 
systems in buildings to 







Attacks While Training 
Prior to 9/11, Report 
Says,” Global Security 
Newswire,16 June 
2004. 
Unspecified Radiological An al-Qa'ida insider has 
alleged that Usama Bin 
Ladin was pressured by 
network affiliates to 
purchase radiological 
material through 
contacts in Chechnya. 
The insider has been 
named as Abu Walid al-
Misri. Misri is 
reportedly planning to 
publish a book detailing 
his relationship with 




Nick Fielding, “Bin 
Laden's Dirty Bomb 
Quest Exposed,” 
London Times Online, 









Unspecified Nuclear Pakistani businessman 
Saifullah Paracha 
allegedly told al-Qa'ida 
operatives that he knew 
where to obtain nuclear 
weapons that could be 
used against U.S. 
troops. Paracha denied 
the allegations but 
admitted to meeting 
Usama Bin Ladin in 
1999 to discuss 
business deals. Paracha 
owns an import 









Initiative, 11 February 
2005; Frank Davies, 
“U.S. Alleges Pakistani 
Businessman Urged al 
Qaeda to Acquire 
Nuclear Weapons,” 




Jamal al-Fadhl claims 
that, on behalf of Bin 
Ladin, he investigated 






witness at US 
trial 
Kimberly McCloud and 
Matthew Osborne, 
“WMD Terrorism and 
Usama bin Ladin,” CNS




1996-1998 Chemical Bin Ladin allegedly 
purchases CW over a 
two-year period prior to 
1998 from European 
states and the former 
Soviet Union. This 
information is allegedly 
provided under custody 
by the Jihad leader 
(arrested on August 20, 
1998 in Baku, 
Azerbaijan) during the 
April 1999 “Trial of the 
Returnees from 
Albania” in Egypt. 
4/1999 Ahmad Salama 
Mabruk (in 
custody during 
his trial in 
Egypt) 
Muhammad Salah, “Bin 
Ladin Front Reportedly 
Bought CBW From E. 
Europe,”Al-Hayah, 20 









members, are allegedly 
trained in secret camps 
near Baghdad in how to 
use CW and BW by 
instructors from the 
secret Iraqi military 









“Militia defector claims 
Baghdad trained Al-
Qaeda fighters in 
chemical warfare,” 
Sunday Times 









10/1997 Chemical / 
Biological 
A meeting is held in 
Sudan between Bin 
Ladin, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and Hasan al-
Turabi, leader of 
Sudan's National 
Islamic Front regime, 
about the construction 
of a CBW factory. 
10/1997 Unspecified 
report received 




Jihad Salim, “Report on 
Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, 
'Afghans',” Al-Watan 
al-Arabi, 16 February 
2001 
1998 Nuclear On 8 February 2004, 
the Egyptian newspaper 
Al-Hayat reported that 
al-Qa'ida had purchased 
tactical nuclear 
weapons from the 
Ukraine in 1998 and 
was “storing them for 
possible use”. Al-Qa'ida 
allegedly purchased the 
bombs in Kandahar 
after a visit from 
Ukrainian scientists. 
The Ukrainian 
government denied that 
the transaction had 
taken place, stating that 
all nuclear weapons 
stored in the Ukraine 
had been transferred to 




“Al-Qaida Said to 
Possess Nuclear Arms,” 
Associated Press, 9 
February 2004; “Al-
Qaida May Have 
Nuclear Weapons,” Al 
Jazeera.net, 8 February 
2004; “Al-Qaida Does 
Not Have Our Nuclear 
Bombs Insists Ukraine,”
The Scotsman, 11 
February 2004; Sokov, 
Nikolai, “Suitcase 
Nukes: Permanently 
Lost Luggage,” CNS,13 
February 2004; Jane 
Macartney, “Al-Qaeda 
Unlikely to Have 
Attained Nuclear 
Know-How,” Reuters, 6 
February 2004. 
1998 Nuclear / 
Radiological 
Russian intelligence 
allegedly blocks a deal 
in which a Pakistani 
firm controlled by Bin 
Ladin attempted to 
purchase Soviet-origin 
uranium. 




Earl Lane and Knut 
Royce, “Nuclear 
Aspirations? Sources: 
Bin Laden Tried to 
Obtain Enriched 










1998 Chemical / 
Biological 
A reporter purchases 
two computers from a 
looter in Kabul, 
Afghanistan, that had 
been found in an 
abandoned al-Qa`ida 
office. The U.S. 
government confirms 
the existence of the 
computers. One of the 
computers allegedly 
contains a file 
describing “plans to 
launch a chemical and 
biological weapons 




describing his CW and 
BW program, 
codenamed “Curdled 
Milk,” which included 
work on a 
pesticide/nerve agent 
that used a chemical to 
increase absorption and 
was tested on rabbits 
and dogs. He was 
assisted by Midhat al-
Mursi / Abu Khabbab, a 
chemical engineer.  
12/2001 al-Qa`ida 
computers 
Alan Culluson and 
Andrew Higgins, 
“Computer in Kabul 
holds chilling memos,” 
Wall Street Journal, 31 
December 2001; 
“Report: Al Qaeda 
Computer Had Plans for 
Bio-Weapons,” Reuters, 
21 December 2001 
5/1998 Chemical / 
Biological 
Bin Ladin's group 
reportedly purchases 
three CBW factories in 
the former Yugoslavia 
and hires a number of 
Ukrainian chemists and 





“Islamic Group Said 
Preparing Chemical 
Warfare on the West,” 
Corriere della Sera, 8 
July 1998; Yossef 
Bodansky, Bin Laden: 
The Man Who Declared 
War on America 
(Roseville, CA: Prima, 









8/1998 Chemical The United States 
charges that al-Qa`ida is 
producing chemical 
weapons at the al-Shifa 
pharmaceutical factory 
in Khartoum, Sudan. As 
a result, the United 
States bombs the 





“Chemical Weapons in 
the Sudan: Allegations 
and Evidence,” The 
Nonproliferation 
Review (Fall 1998), pp. 
115-36 
8/1998 Chemical John Gannon, chairman 
of the National 
Intelligence Council, 
reveals that the CIA 
discovered that Bin 
Ladin had attempted to 
acquire unspecified CW 
for use against U.S. 
troops stationed in the 
Persian Gulf. 
8/1998 US Central 
Intelligence 
Agency 
Barry Schweid, “US 
Suggests Iraq Got 
Weapons from Sudan,” 
Record (New Jersey), 
27 August 1998 
9/1998 Nuclear/ 
Radiological 
A Bin Ladin aide, 
Mamduh Mahmud 
Salim, is arrested in 
Munich, Germany, on 
charges of trying to 







Benjamin Weiser, “US 
Says Bin Ladin Aide 
Tried to Get Nuclear 
Weapons,” New York 
Times, 26 September 
1998 
9/1998 Chemical Wadi al-Hajj, a 
Lebanese national, is 
arrested in Arlington, 
Texas, for perjury. The 
FBI contends that he 
had lied about his 
affiliation with Bin 
Ladin in 1997 and 1998 
court testimonies. A 
grand jury investigates 
al-Hajj's possible 
activities in procuring 
CW for Bin Ladin. 
12/20/1998 US 
Government 
CNN, 20 December 
1998 
12/1998 Chemical / 
Nuclear 
In an interview with 
Time magazine, Bin 
Ladin asserts that 
acquiring weapons of 
any type, including 
chemical and nuclear, is 
a Muslim “religious 
duty.” 
12/1998 Usama bin 
Ladin 
Time, 24 December 
1998, transcript of 










1999 Chemical Local Afghan sources 
say that Bin Ladin is 
using a plant in 
Charassiab, a district 30 
kilometers south of 




“Afghan Alliance -- 
UBL Trying to Make 
Chemical Weapons,” 
Parwan Payam-e 
Mojahed, 23 December 
1999 
4/1999 Biological Bin Ladin and his 
followers allegedly 
obtain BW substances 
through the mail from 
countries of the former 
Soviet Union (the Ebola 
virus and salmonella 
bacterium), from East 
Asia (anthrax-causing 
bacteria), and from the 
Czech Republic 




“Trial of the 
Returnees 
from Albania”
Al J. Venter, “Elements 
Loyal to Bin Laden 
Acquire Biological 
Agents 'Through the 
Mail',” Jane's 
Intelligence Review 
(August 1999); Khalid 
Sharaf al-Din, “Bin 
Ladin Men Reportedly 
Possess Biological 
Weapons,” Al-Sharq al-
Awsat, 6 March 1999  
6/1999 Chemical / 
Biological 
Usama bin Ladin 
reportedly constructed 
“crude” CBW 
laboratories in Khost 
and Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan, and 
acquired ingredients for 
CW and BW from 




John McWethy, “Bin 
Laden Set to Strike 
Again?”, ABC News, 
16 June 1999 
7/1999 Chemical / 
Biological 
An Islamist lawyer 
states that Bin Ladin's 
organization has CBW, 
and will likely use such 







“Islamist Lawyer on 
Bin Ladin, Groups,” Al-
Sharq al-Awsat, 12 July 
1999 
2/2000 Chemical An apparent plot by 
nine Moroccans to 
poison the water supply 
of the U.S. Embassy in 
Rome using a cyanide 
compound is foiled by 
Italian police. 
2/2002 Various media 
reports 
Eric Croddy et. al., 
“Chemical Terrorist 
Plot in Rome?” CNS 
Research Story, 11 
March 2002 
2/2/2000 Chemical / 
Biological 
CIA Director George 
Tenet tells the Senate 
that Bin Ladin has 
shown a strong interest 
in CW and that his 
operatives have “trained 
to conduct attacks with 
toxic chemicals or 
biological toxins.” 
8/19/2002 CIA Director 
George Tenet 
Pamela Hess, “Al Qaida 
may have chemical 
weapons,” United Press 










Late 2000 Nuclear The intelligence agency 
of an unnamed 
European country 






Turkmenistan, and the 
Ukraine--intended for 
Bin Ladin and the 
Taliban regime of 
Afghanistan. 
12/24/2000 “Arab security 
sources” 
“Arab Security Sources 
Speak of a New 
Scenario for 
Afghanistan: Secret 
Roaming Networks that 
Exchange Nuclear 
Weapons for Drugs,” 
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 
December 2000 
2001 Biological Various reports 
describe Muhammad 
Atta, the leader of the 
September 11 hijackers, 
meeting in Prague with 
an Iraqi intelligence 
agent, who allegedly 
gave him a vial of 
anthrax. This claim, 
originally made by 
foreign intelligence 
sources, was later 
contested by the Czech 
government. 











Connections to Anthrax 
Attacks,” Newsmax; 
Kriendler & Kreindler 
9/11 lawsuit; “Prague 
Discounts an Iraqi 
Meeting,” New York 
Times, 21 October 
2001; “Czechs retract 
Iraq terror link,” UPI, 
20 October 2001 
2001 Biological Ahmad Rassam, 
arrested in a plot to 
bomb LAX, testifies 
that Bin Laden is 
personally interested in 
using low-flying 





Rassam, in US 
custody 
“Bin Laden's Biological 
Threat,” BBC, 28 
October 2001 
2001 Biological Documents found in 
Afghanistan ostensibly 
reveal that al-Qa`ida 
was doing research on 
using botulinum toxin 
to kill 2,000 people. 
1/1/2002 al-Qa`ida 
documents 
“Al Qaeda tested germ 
weapons,” Reuters, 1 
January 2002 
2001 Chemical Ahmad Rassam (an al-
Qa`ida terrorist who 
pleaded guilty to 
plotting to bomb LAX) 
claims in court in 2001 
that he had witnessed 





Rassam, in US 
custody 
Pamela Hess, “Al Qaida 
May Have Chemical 
Weapons,” United Press 










2001 Biological In December 2001, 
Yazid Sufaat was 
arrested in Malaysia for 
terrorist activities as a 
member of Jemaah 
Islamiyah. According to 
subsequent 




Qa'ida and Hambali of 
Jamaah Islamiyah, 
Sufaat was part of a 
plan to obtain and 
weaponize biological 
warfare agents. Jamaah 
Islamiyah maintains 
close ties to al-Qa'ida. 
1-Dec-01 Malaysian 
authorities 
Maria Ressa, “Reports: 
Al Qaeda [sic] 
Operative Sought 
Anthrax,” CNN, 10 
October 2003; Judith 
Miller, “U.S. Has New 
Concerns About 
Anthrax Readiness,” 
New York Times, 28 
December 2003; “Yazid 
Sufaat,” The Open 
Source Threat Network 
Database, 26 January 
2004. 
2/2001 Chemical The United States 
allegedly aborts a 
planned air strike 
against Afghanistan for 
fear of a retaliatory 
chemical attack by al-
Qa`ida, after receiving 
warnings from an Arab 
embassy in Islamabad, 
Pakistan. 
2/2001 “Arab sources” Sa'id al-Qaysi, “US 
Said Aborted Planned 
Attack on Bin Ladin for 
Fear of 'Chemical 
Strike',” Al-Watan al-
Arabi, 16 February 
2001 
2/2001 Chemical Bin Ladin's elite 055 
Brigade is supposedly 
reorganized under the 
leadership of Midhat al-
Mursi, aka Abu 
Khabab, an Egyptian 
and an expert in sarin 
gas production. 
2/2001 “Sources in 
Afghanistan” 
Sa'id al-Qaysi, “US 
Said Aborted Planned 
Attack on Bin Ladin for 
Fear of 'Chemical 
Strike',” Al-Watan al-
Arabi, 16 February 
2001 
4/2001 Nuclear / 
Radiological 
Ivan Ivanov claims he 
met Bin Ladin just over 
the Pakistani border in 
China, and discussed 
setting up an 
environmental company 
to buy nuclear waste. 
Ivanov was then 
approached by a 
Pakistani chemical 
engineer interested in 
buying nuclear fuel rods 











Adam Nathan and 
David Leppard, “al-
Qa`ida's men held secret 
meetings to build 'dirty 
bomb',” Sunday Times 



















fighters in northern Iraq 
in the use of CBW 
agents, and possibly 
also in the handling of 
nuclear devices. 
Between 150 and 250 
al-Qa`ida trainees 
purportedly passed 
through the training 
facilities. 








“Abu Nidal's Nemesis,” 
DEBKA file 




Nuclear Bin Ladin allegedly 
buys 48 “suitcase 
nukes” from the 
Russian mafiya.  





Serious Information on 
al-Qa`ida's Attempt to 
Acquire Nuclear Arms,”
Al-Majallah [London-




Chemical CNN releases 
videotapes, allegedly 
made by al-Qa`ida, 
showing dogs being 
killed by unidentified 
toxic chemicals (experts 
believe either a crude 
nerve agent or hydrogen 
cyanide gas is used). 
8/19/2002 al-Qa`ida 
videotapes 
“Insight,” CNN, 19 
August 2002 
11/2001 Chemical / 
Nuclear 
In an interview, Bin 
Ladin claims “We have 
chemical and nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent 
and if America used 
them against us we 
reserve the right to use 
them.” 
11/2001 Usama bin 
Ladin 
Hamid Mir, “Osama 
Claims He Has Nukes: 
If US Uses N-Arms it 




11/2001 Chemical / 
Nuclear 
In an interview with a 
Pakistani newspaper 
reporter, Usama bin 
Ladin states that “we 
have chemical and 
nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent, and if 
America used them 
against us we reserve 
the right to use them.” 







Hamid Mir, “Osama 
claims he has nukes: If 
US uses N-arms it will 
get same response,” 










11/2001 Nuclear al-Qa`ida reportedly 
acquires a Russian-
made suitcase nuclear 
weapon from Central 
Asian sources. The 
device is reported to 
weigh 8 kg and to 
possess at least 2 kg of 
fissionable uranium and 
plutonium. The report 
said the device, with a 
serial number of 9999 
and a manufacturing 
date of October 1998, 
could be set off by a 
mobile phone signal. 
11/14/2001 “Reports from 
Pakistan” 
“N-weapons May be in 




11/2001 Nuclear A Times (London) 
reporter discovers a 
blueprint for a 
“Nagasaki bomb” in 
files found in an 
abandoned al-Qa`ida 
house in Kabul, 
Afghanistan. 
11/19/2001 al-Qa`ida files “Nuke Plans Found; 
Brit Paper Discovers 
Details of Weapons in 
Kabul Safe House,” 
Toronto Sun, 15 
November 2001; Hugh 
Dougherty, “Afghan 
Nuclear Weapons 




11/2001 Nuclear A so-called 
“Superbomb” manual, 
which discusses the 
advanced physics of 
nuclear weapons and 
dirty bombs, is found in 
Kabul in November 
2001.  
6/23/2002 Author of Mail 
on Sunday 
article 
“Osama Bin Laden's bid 
to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction 
represents the greatest 
threat that Western 
Civilization has faced,” 
Mail on Sunday 
(London), 23 June 2002
Late 2001 Biological U.S. operatives in 
Afghanistan allegedly 
discover evidence 
indicating that one or 
more Russian scientists 


















Late 2001 Biological Reports claim that al-
Zawahiri's home in 
Kabul tested positive 
(perhaps falsely) for 
traces of anthrax, as did 
five of nineteen al-





Found in al-Qaeda 
home,” Global Security 
Newswire, 10 
December 2001; Judith 
Miller, “Labs Suggest 
Qaeda Planned to Build 
Arms, Officials Say,” 
New York Times, 14 
September 2002 




suggested that a 
biological attack was 









“US biological attack 
imminent -- Taliban,” 
iafrica.com, 12 
December 2001; 
“Walker Lindh: Al 
Qaeda Planned More 




French Interior Minister 
Dominique de Villepin 
claimed that al-Qa'ida 
affiliates have produced 
chemical and biological 
weapons in Georgia's 
Pankisi Gorge. De 
Villepin told members 
of a bio-terrorism 
conference in Lyons, 
France, that after the 
fall of the Taliban, al-
Qa'ida cells moved to 
the Pankisi Gorge in 
order to continue efforts 
to produce anthrax 





Biological Weapons in 
Georgia--French 
Minister,” Moscow 
News, 3 January 2005. 
2002 Chemical One of the facilities of 
Ansar al-Islam, a 
radical Islamist group 
operating in northern 
Iraq with ties to al-
Qa`ida and Iran, 
produces a form of 
cyanide cream (not a 
WMD) that kills on 
contact. 
8/25/2002 Unnamed U.S. 
interrogators 
William Safire, “Tying 
Saddam to Terrorist 
Organizations,” New 










first half of 
2002 
Biological Ansar al-Islam is 
reported to have been 
experimenting with 
ricin, a deadly toxin, 
including on at least 
one human being. This 






“US knew of bioterror 
tests in Iraq,” BBC 
News, 20 August 2002; 
“US Monitors Kurdish 
Extremists,” Fox News, 
21 August 2002; Isma'il 
Zayir, “Ansar al-Islam 
Group Accuses [Jalal] 
Talabani of Spreading 
Rumors About Its 
Cooperation with al-
Qa`ida,” Al-Hayah, 22 
August 2002 
1/2002 Nuclear Diagrams of U.S. 
nuclear power plants 
are found in abandoned 






Bill Gertz, “Nuclear 
Plants Targeted,” 
Washington Times, 31 
January 2002; John J. 
Lumpkin, “Diagrams 
Show Interest in Nuke 
Plants,” Associated 
Press, 30 January 2002 





raising the question 
whether al-Qa`ida 
might have been tricked 
into buying metal 
containers with phony 
nuclear symbols filled 
with worthless material.
2/26/2002 US analysts Thom Shanker, “US 
Analysts Find No Sign 
bin Laden Had Nuclear 
Arms,” New York 




Biological US forces discover a 
BW laboratory under 
construction near 
Kandahar that was 
abandoned by al-
Qa`ida. It was allegedly 
being built to produce 
anthrax, but no 
biological agents or 
traces thereof were 
found in the facility. 
3/22/2002 US 
Government 
Dominic Evans, “US 
Troops Found Afghan 
Biological Lab,” 
Reuters, 22 March 
2002; Michael R. 
Gordon, “US Says it 
Found Qaeda Lab Being 
Built to Produce 
Anthrax,” New York 









4/2002 Radiological Abu Zubayda claims al-
Qa`ida has the interest 
and know-how to 
produce a radiological 
weapon, and the group 
may already have one 





“Zubaydah: al Qaeda 
Had 'Dirty Bomb' 
Know-How,” CNN, 22 
April 2002; “Al-Qaeda 
Claims 'Dirty Bomb' 
Know-How,” BBC, 23 
April 2002 
5/2002 Radiological U.S. citizen Abdullah 
al-Muhajir (formerly 
José Pedilla), is arrested 
in Chicago and alleged 
to be involved with al-
Qa`ida in planning to 
perpetrate a radiological 




Dan Eggen and Susan 
Schmidt, “'Dirty Bomb' 
Plot Uncovered, US 
Says: Suspected Al 
Qaeda Operative Held 
as 'Enemy Combatant',” 
Washington Post, 11 
June 2002 
5/2002 Chemical Among the items seized 
during the arrest of 
Sami Uthman, a 
Lebanese national who 
moved to the US and 
became an Imam at a 
Islamist mosque in 
Seattle, are papers by 
London-based al-Qa`ida 










Patrick J. McDonnell 
and Josh Meyer, “Links 
to Terrorism Probed in 
Northwest,” Los 
Angeles Times, 13 July 
2002 
6/3/2002 Radiological al-Qa`ida allegedly 
attempts to acquire 11 
lbs of radioactive 
thallium from 
measuring devices on 
decommissioned 
Russian submarines, but 
Russia's Federal 
Security Service claims 






“Insider Notes,” United 
Press International, 3 
June 2002 
7/18/2002 Biological Stephen Younger, 
director of the Defense 
Threat Reduction 
Agency, claims that al-
Qa`ida's interest in 















9/1/2002 Nuclear On 23 January 2005, 
German police 
announced the arrest of 
an Iraqi al-Qa'ida 
member who had 
allegedly attempted to 
purchase uranium in 
Luxembourg. In 
September 2002, 
Ibrahim Muhammad K. 
attempted to purchase 
48 grams (1.5) ounces 
of uranium from an 
unnamed group in 
Luxembourg. 
Prosecutors claim that 
the amount of uranium 
was insufficient for the 





“Germnay Arrests Two 
Al Qaeda Suspects,” 
Washington Post, 24 
January 2005; 
“Germany; Al Qaeda 
Suspects Held,” Facts 
on File World News 
Digest, 27 January 
2005; “Iraqi Al-Qaeda 
Suspect held in 
Germany Sent by Bin 
Laden,” Agence France 
Presse, 29 January 
2005. 
9/13/2002 Chemical / 
Biological 
Pentagon officials 
admit that lab 
equipment found near 
Kandahar, Afghanistan, 
supports the assessment 
that al-Qa`ida might 
have acquired what it 
needed for “a very 
limited production of 




Judith Miller, “Lab 
Suggests Qaeda Planned 
to Build Arms, Officials 
Say,” New York Times, 
14 September 2002 
10/2002 or 
11/2002 
Chemical The Islamist group 
Asbat al-Ansar, a 
Lebanon-based Sunni 
organization affiliated 
with al-Qa`ida that is 
currently operating in 
northern Iraq, 
reportedly obtained the 
nerve agent VX from 
the Iraqi regime. 
12/12/2002 US 
Government 
Barton Gellman, “US 
Suspects Al Qaeda Got 
Nerve Agent From 
Iraqis,” Washington 
Post, 12 December 
2002 
11/9/2002 Chemical British security officials 
arrest three men 
reportedly plotting a 




Hala Jaber and Nicholas 
Rufford, “MI5 foils 
poison-gas attack on the 
Tube,” Sunday Times 










Early 2003 Radiological After the 2003 
Casablanca bombings, a 
police roundup of 
Salafia Jihadia exposed 
a plot by 'Abd al-'Aziz 
ibn Laysh to attack a 
French nuclear power 
plant at Cap de la 
Hague. Additional 
evidence indicates that 
members of al-Qa`ida 
trained Salafia Jihadia 





Morocco Deeper Than 
Imagined,” United Press 
International, 7 June, 
2003; “Frenchman on 
Trial in Morocco Over 
Suicide Bombings,” 
Agence France Presse, 
25 August, 2003. 
1/5/2003 Biological Six Algerians were 
arrested in London and 
charged with plotting to 
produce ricin. 
Authorities discovered 
traces of ricin and 
equipment used to 
process castor beans in 
the apartment. 
According to news 
sources, the group was 
plotting to attack a 
British military base by 
poisoning the food. 
Later reports indicate 
that the substance tested 




Jeffrey Bale, Anjali 
Bhattacharjee, Eric 
Croddy, and Richard 
Pilch, MD, “Ricin 




Studies, 23 January 













3/1/2003 Radiological On 20 March 2003, the 
FBI announced that 
they were searching for 
Adnan al- Shukrijuma 
in connection with the 
Jose Padilla case. 
Padilla was arrested 
May 2002 for plotting 
to obtain materials in 
Canada for a dirty 
bomb. Shukrijuma was 
identified from 
documents obtained in 
connection with the 
2002 arrest of Ramzi 
bin al-Shib, a key 9/11 
architect. 
3/1/2003 FBI Bill Gertz, “Al Qaeda 
Pursued a Dirty Bomb,”
Washington Times, 17 
October 2003; pg. A1; 
Entity Record: “Adnan 
El Shukrijumah,” 
Sentenial TMS Records: 
Tracking the Threat, 25 
November 2003. 
Available online at: 
http://www.trackingthet
hreat.com/db/ENT1706.
htm. Accessed 20 May 
2004; Katherine 
Wexler, “Father Denies 
Son Linked to Terror,” 
St. Petersburg Times, 
22 March 2003; Scott 
Wheeler, “Evidence 
Points to Dirty-Bomb 
Plot,” Insight Magazine, 
29 October 2003. 
2004 Radiological Reports indicate that an 
al-Qa'ida affiliate 
named Midhat Mursi 
may have been 
constructing a “dirty 
bomb” in early 2004. 
Mursi is reportedly in 
contact with Ayman al-
Zawahiri and was 
suspected of managing 
al-Qa'ida chemical labs 
in Afghanistan. Mursi 





Qandyl, “Searching for 





1/23/2004 Chemical U.S. forces found 3kg 
of cyanide at the 
Baghdad house of 
Ahmad Fadhl Nazzal 
al-Khalayila, an aide to 
Zarqawi. The cyanide 
was to be placed in 
construction bricks and 
used against coalition 
troops. Troops also 
uncovered a document 
thought to be written by 
Zarqawi asking al-
Qa'ida for aid. 
2/7/2004 U.S. 
Government 
John Lumpkin, “U.S. 
Forces in Iraq Find 
Some Cyanide,” 
Associated Press, 7 
February 2004; Douglas 
Jehl, “U.S. Aids Report 
Evidence Tying Al 
Qaeda To Attacks,” 










3/1/2004 Chemical British authorities 
announced they had 
thwarted a possible 
chemical attack 
tenuously linked to al-
Qa'ida. The plot, which 
was in an early 
planning stage, 
involved the use of 
conventional explosions 
enhanced with osmium 
tetroxide in London's 
shopping centers, 





Planned for Use in 
Potential British Bomb 
Plot,” Agence France 
Presse, 26 April 2004; 
“Osmium Tetroxide: A 
New Chemical 
Terrorism Weapon,” 
CNS Research Story of 
the Week,13 April 
2004; available at: 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/
week/040413.htm. 
4/20/2004 Chemical The Jordanian 
Intelligence Service 
seized six trucks wired 
with explosives 
containing 20 tons of an 
unknown chemical. The 
trucks were reportedly 
part of a plot by 
Zarqawi and a number 




Minister's Office, and 




Chemical Attack in 
Jordan Could Have 
Killed 80,000,” Agence 
France Presse, 26 April 
2004; “Confessions of 
Group Planning Jordan 
Chemical Attack,” BBC 
Monitoring, 26 April 
2004; Interview with 
Mahmud Al-Kharabsha, 












Eight men were arrested 
in Britain and charged 
with conspiracy to 





materials. Also in their 
possession were plans 
of the New York Stock 
Exchange, the Citigroup 
Building in New York, 
the International 
Monetary Fund in 
Washington, and the 
Prudential Building in 
New Jersey. The arrests 
occured two weeks after 
a series of 13 arrests of 
men allegedly affiliated 
with the al-Qa'ida 
network. The men were 
identified as Dhiren 
Barot, Omar Abdur 
Rehman, Zia ul Haq, 




Bhatti, Quaisar Shaffi, 
and Junade Feroze. 
Aug-04 British 
Government 
Ben English, “Britain 
Charges Eight Over US 
'Terror Campaign,'“ The 
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